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ABSTRACT. The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal
scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been
focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate
speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate
speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond
legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt
to understand the general concept hate speech. And it does so using a range of well-
known methods of conceptual analysis that are distinctive of analytic philosophy.
One of its main aims is to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of
hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that
hate speech is best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important
implication is that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate
speech, including but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason
to embrace an understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of
expressive phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech
laws on the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising
emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred.
I. INTRODUCTION
In ‘What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate’ (henceforth ‘The
Myth of Hate’) I explored the possibility that the ordinary concept
hate speech is amenable to a form of decompositional conceptual
analysis involving three building-block concepts (1) speech, (2) groups
or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics, and (3) emo-
tions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. I then focused on the third
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building block, hate or hatred. I argued that although there are
various possible connections between speech and hate, none appear
to capture an essential feature or necessary, defining quality of hate
speech. I concluded, therefore, that we should reject what I called
the myth of hate. In addition to this, I looked at the following
alternative analyses of the term ‘hate speech’: first, that its semantics
are semi- or quasi-compositional, akin to ‘zebra crossing’ or ‘pillow
talk’; second, that it is part of a larger group of terms which also
contain the word ‘hate’ and are core-dependent homonyms. But I
found that these alternatives did not in fact provide clear-cut reasons
for not rejecting the myth of hate.
In this second part I shall proceed with a different working
hypothesis to that assumed by the method of conceptual decom-
position. I shall build on the premise that the semantics of the term
‘hate speech’ are non-compositional, so that its meaning is not a
function of the literal meanings of its parts. I shall also proceed on
the basis that the term ‘hate speech’ is a relatively opaque idiom, that
is, hard to understand simply by looking at the literal meanings of
the terms ‘hate’ and ‘speech’, and is, therefore, unlike relatively
transparent idioms such as ‘zebra crossing’ or ‘pillow talk’.
The main aim of this part, however, is to challenge the
assumption that the term ‘hate speech’ is univocal or has a single
meaning and that, all being well, a single shared definition should
emerge over time to reflect that single meaning. Instead, I argue that
the term ‘hate speech’ is equivocal, that it denotes a family of
meanings, for which there is no one overarching precise definition
available.
The remainder of the article is structured thusly. Section II tries
to motivate the idea that the term ‘hate speech’ is an equivocal
idiom. Then, Sections III to VI present a detailed analysis of the
ordinary concept hate speech and ordinary uses of the term ‘hate
speech’ employing four methods of conceptual analysis: purpose-ori-
ented analysis (coming to know something of the roles or purposes
that we expect the term ‘hate speech’ to fulfil), folk platitudes analysis
(coming to know something of how ordinary language users gen-
eralise about the term ‘hate speech’ and, indirectly, about the phe-
nomena it is supposed to refer to), intuitions about cases analysis
(coming to know something of the intuitions that ordinary language
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users have about the application of the term ‘hate speech’ to par-
ticular cases), and ordinary language analysis (coming to know
something of what ordinary language users do with the term ‘hate
speech’). Section VII responds to the failure of Sections III to VI to
formulate a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the
appropriate use of the term ‘hate speech’ by arguing that the concept
hate speech is what Ludwig Wittgenstein called a ‘family resem-
blances’ concept.1 Finally, Section VIII looks at the implications of
the foregoing arguments for what we can and should say on the
important topic of appropriate and inappropriate ways to combat
hate speech.
II. ‘HATE SPEECH’ AS AN EQUIVOCAL IDIOM
In ‘The Myth of Hate’ I argued that ‘hate speech’, despite appear-
ances, is not a relatively transparent idiom like ‘zebra crossing’ and
‘pillow talk’. The term ‘hate’ does not provide the sorts of useful
clues to the meaning of ‘hate speech’ which ‘zebra’ provides for
‘zebra crossing’ and ‘pillow’ for ‘pillow talk’. I also believe that ‘hate
speech’ is unlike ‘zebra crossing’ and ‘pillow talk’ in another
important way. Unlike them, it does not have a single meaning. Of
course, the pillow talk of one couple will not be the same as that of a
second or third couple. Instances of pillow talk will be varied. But
the term ‘pillow talk’ does seem to have a single meaning: conver-
sation in bed, of an intimate kind, often before or after sex. Consequently,
this term can only be meaningfully applied to finite conjunctions of
relatively limited types of context, speech content, emotion or
feeling, speaker, and activity. The term ‘hate speech’, by contrast,
can be applied to countless permutations of relatively unlimited
types of context, speech content, emotions, feelings, or attitudes,
speakers, and activity. This suggests strongly to me that we are
dealing with multiple meanings.
Some neologisms continue to carry the single meaning intended
by those who coined them even when, over time, they become an
accepted part of the mainstream lexicon. The term ‘pillow talk’ has
to a large extent retained its original meaning as coined. What is
more, people who know what the term ‘pillow talk’ means often do
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th Edn, P. Hacker and J. Schulte (eds.) (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2009), p. 36 [67].
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not know, and certainly do not need to know, how and why this
term came to possess the meaning it does. They are not familiar with
Joseph Dunn’s Irish epic tale Táin Bó Cúalnge. Interestingly, most
ordinary language users who use the term ‘hate speech’ do so quite
comfortably also without having heard of, much less having read,
the work of Matsuda. They feel their way into its semantics by
seeing how it used by current language users. But, in contrast to
‘pillow talk’, the term ‘hate speech’ has acquired a great many more
meanings with the passage of time. As coined by Matsuda, the term
meant, at its core, racist insult. It is now used to mean a bewildering
array of things including a great deal that is not racist and not insult.
What I am claiming, in other words, is not simply that a variety of
different things can count as hate speech, just as many things can
count as pillow talk. I am claiming that the term ‘hate speech’ has
more than one meaning. Of course, it has become something of a
cliché to assert that there is profound disagreement about the
meaning of the term ‘hate speech’, disagreement not only among
legal scholars and legal professionals2 but also among ordinary lan-
guage users.3 But my claim is not that people disagree about what
the correct definition of the term is; after all, that would be con-
sistent with one of the definitions being correct and there actually
being a single meaning. Instead, what I am claiming is that the term
‘hate speech’ is systematically ambiguous; which is to say, it carries a
multiplicity of different meanings. On the other hand, I also believe
that this multiplicity is more akin to a family than a mélange of
meanings. I shall say more about this in Section VII.
Of course, as explained in ‘The Myth of Hate’, some writers have
defined the term ‘hate speech’ in a disjunctive way. And, as such, it
could be tempting to think that the term does, after all, have a single
meaning albeit a complex disjunctive meaning, similar to how the
term ‘jade’ means nephrite or jadeite. On this reading, the term ‘hate
speech’ could mean something like speech or other expressive conduct
which insults or degrades or defames or negatively stereotypes or incites
hatred, discrimination or violence against persons or groups of persons
2 See, e.g., Anne Weber, Manual on Hate Speech (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009), p. 3.
3 The same point is made by Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 8; Nadine Strossen, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P.
Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 395.
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based on their race or religion or sexual orientation or gender identity or
disability and which is intimately connected with feelings, emotions or
attitudes of hate or contempt or despisement. The problem with offering
a complex disjunctive definition based on lists of phenomena,
however, is that no sooner do we think that we have arrived at the
definitive lists than we run up against phenomena that most ordinary
language users would instinctively want to call ‘hate speech’ but
which are not on the lists. If it is not possible for us to provide
definitive lists, and not possible to specify essential qualities shared
by all the things on our lists, then we are left with two possibilities.
One is that although the term ‘hate speech’ does have a single
meaning at any given time (constituted by the lists), that meaning is
constantly changing. A second is that the concept hate speech is a
systematically ambiguous concept and, therefore, the term ‘hate
speech’ has more than one meaning. I find the first possibility
implausible: surely not every new or unconventional application of
the term ‘hate speech’ denotes a change in its meaning.
The best we can hope for, and this is no mean achievement in my
view, is to significantly improve our understanding of the ambiguity
of the term ‘hate speech’, by mapping as much of the stunning
heterogeneity of the phenomena to which it refers and as much of
the vast array of different connotations it carries as possible. The
crucial point here is that giving up on the idea that the term ‘hate
speech’ has a single meaning does not necessarily mean accepting
forms of analysis that are insubstantive, unrigorous, and uninfor-
mative. Quite the opposite.
But what sorts of analyses are appropriate for understanding an
equivocal idiom and are at the same time substantive, rigorous and
informative? Decompositional conceptual analysis is distinctive
partly because it expects to supply a precise definition of the concept
or term under analysis, a set of necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for things falling under the concept hate speech or being
appropriately called ‘hate speech’. Unlike decompositional con-
ceptual analysis, however, other forms of analysis embrace the idea
that providing such conditions is not the be-all and end-all and may
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not even be possible given the nature of the concept, such as when
the term in question has multiple meanings or is an umbrella term
for a varied collection of phenomena. In particular, my aim is to see
whether four other methods of philosophical conceptual analysis,
namely, purpose-oriented analysis, folk platitudes analysis, intuitions
about cases analysis, and ordinary language analysis, have anything
distinctive to say about how we can, and should, characterise (if not
define) the ordinary concept hate speech and the ordinary term ‘hate
speech’ that either has not been or could not be inferred from de-
compositional analysis.
Before commencing this work, however, I want to briefly state
and then respond to a possible objection to the project I have out-
lined. The objection is that it is foolish to focus on the methods of
analytic philosophy when so many other disciplines have so much to
say about the ordinary concept hate speech. Psychologists look at hate
speech using insights gleaned from their professional experience
working with victims of hate speech.4 Sociologists have sought to
understand the relationship between hate speech and group
dynamics.5 Linguists have investigated the extent, nature and origins
of dehumanising metaphors used in hate speech.6 And political sci-
entists and cultural ethnologists have employed the techniques of
discourse analysis to assess uses of the term ‘hate speech’ in public
and political discourse, including in newspaper articles on politics, in
political discussion on the Internet, in political meetings, and in
parliamentary debates.7 Discourse analysis looks upon the term ‘hate
speech’ not as something with a universal, trans-contextual meaning,
but as a term that is used by people whose discourse is embedded in
particular social practices, psychological states of mind, institutional
structures, cultural environments, ideologies, and political hierar-
4 See, e.g., Melba Vasquez and Cynthia de las Fuentes, ‘Hate Speech or Freedom of Expression?
Balancing Autonomy and Feminist Ethics in a Pluralistic Society’, in M. Brabeck (ed.) Practicing Feminist
Ethics in Psychology (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000), p. 226.
5 See, e.g., Anthony Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006), pp. 1–6,
140–142.
6 See, e.g., Andreas Musolff, ‘Dehumanizing Metaphors in UK Immigrant Debates in Press and
Online Media’, Journal of Language Aggression & Conflict 3 (2015): 41–56.
7 See, e.g., Shiao-Yun Chiang, ‘‘‘Well, I’m a Lot of Things, But I’m Sure Not a Bigot’’: Positive Self-
Presentation in Confrontational Discourse On Racism’, Discourse and Society 21 (2010): 273–294; David
Boromisza-Habashi, Speaking Hatefully: Culture, Communication, and Political Action in Hungary
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2013); Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara,
‘Freedom of Speech and Racial Vilification in Australia: ‘The Bolt Case’ in Public Discourse’, Australian
Journal of Political Science 48 (2013): 470–484.
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chies and conflicts. One must first understand something of these
contexts in order to understand the many meanings of the term ‘hate
speech’.8 However, I want to be clear that I intend to utilise the
above-mentioned forms of conceptual analysis not because I mean to
rule out or deny the usefulness of discourse analysis but because I am
interested to learn what they might reveal in addition to anything
that discourse analysis might reveal. Moreover, it seems to me that
what I call purpose-oriented analysis could capture at least some of
what discourse analysis captures. Purpose-oriented analysis tries to
tailor our conceptions and characterisations to the roles which
people and institutions expect the relevant concepts and terms to
play for them. It is alive, then, to the part played by those people and
institutions in producing or shaping the contents and semantics of
the very concepts and terms they use.
III. PURPOSE-ORIENTED ANALYSIS
In this section I use purpose-oriented analysis to identify possible
meanings of the term ‘hate speech’ which reflect the purposive
benefits that usage of the term regularly brings. What are the rele-
vant benefits? Justin C. Fisher counts as a benefit ‘anything the
person using the concept in question has practical reason to pursue’.9
So, for example, Frank Jackson suggests that it may be ‘sensible’ to
seek conceptions of the concepts free action and personal identity that
fit in with the jobs we give these concepts ‘in governing what we
care about, our personal relations, our social institutions of reward
and punishment, and the like’.10 Likewise, when it comes to iden-
tifying and perhaps even favouring different characterisations of the
term ‘hate speech’, maybe the question is whether a given char-
acterisation ‘will do any work’.11
8 See, e.g., David Boromisza-Habashi, ‘Hate speech’, The International Encyclopedia of Language and
Social Interaction (Boston, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 2015), p. 716.
9 Justin C. Fisher, ‘Meanings and Methodologies’, in M. Sprevak and J. Kallestrup (eds.) New Waves
in Philosophy of Mind (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 60.
10 Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), p. 45.
11 Robert Post, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech:
Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 31.
WHAT IS HATE SPEECH?
The sort of purpose-oriented conceptual analysis that I am
interested in here maps different meanings of the term ‘hate speech’
onto different types of work the term is doing or ought to be doing
for us. Even if a term performs a beneficial job for those who use it,
however, we should also be willing to evaluate (morally speaking)
the alleged benefits of the jobs performed by that same term from
the perspective of everyone and not simply the users. In other
words, it is a matter of mapping meanings onto jobs that are for the
good of society as whole or jobs that each person in society has
reason to value or care about, objectively speaking. This, of course,
makes the conceptual analysis (or ‘interpretation’) of evaluative
concepts itself an evaluative enterprise.12 Or, as Post puts it, ‘[w]e
must evaluate the status of ‘hate speech’ so defined in order to
determine whether it achieves what we wish to accomplish and
whether the harms of the definition will outweigh its advantages.’13
Now one of the jobs performed by the term ‘hate speech’ that I
have already touched upon in ‘The Myth of Hate’ is that it helps
legal scholars and journalists to categorise and critically evaluate a
body of law that is otherwise heterogeneous. Moreover, legal pro-
fessionals themselves must define the term ‘hate speech’ with a view
to their particular purposes in regulating speech that ought to be
regulated and protected speech that ought not to be regulated.14 But
these are by no means the only or even the most important pur-
poses. No doubt it is possible to conceive of countless jobs that could
be performed by the ordinary concept hate speech and the non-
technocratic term ‘hate speech’. But in what follows I shall focus on
what seem to be the most obvious or widely posited jobs, including
jobs that are broadly beneficial for society as a whole as well as jobs
that might be partially beneficial but may also pose a threat to other
things we care about, not least free speech. At the same time, I will
also endeavour to point out some of the drawbacks with linking the
meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ to these jobs and some of the
limitations of purpose-oriented conceptual analysis itself.
12 Cf. Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’, Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 24 (2004): 1–37, pp. 5–18; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2011), Chap. 8.
13 Post, ‘Interview’, p. 31.
14 Ibid.
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Among the many jobs that are, or might be, performed by the
concept hate speech and the term ‘hate speech’ are: (1) highlighting
forms of speech that it is believed disproportionately harm already
disadvantaged or victimised members of society,15 (2) flagging up
forms of speech that it is believed either are or have the potential to
be very socially divisive or destructive of social cohesion in a diverse,
multiracial, multiethnic, multicultural, multi-sexual, multi-gendered,
and multi-abled societies,16 (3) identifying forms of speech that can
undermine people’s sense that they are members of society in good
standing, who deserve to be treated as equal citizens,17 (4) providing
a means of articulating or giving a particular form and shape to the
decisions that societies and legal-political regimes feel they need to
make, whether explicitly or implicitly, about forms of publically
acceptable speech, the appropriate tone of public debate and, more
generally, the imposition of civility norms,18 (5) labelling forms of
speech that it is believed may run contrary to fundamental demo-
cratic values or even to political legitimacy itself.19
Of course, if we think that our characterisations of the ordinary
concept hate speech should be tailored to one rather than another of
the aforementioned jobs, then our characterisations will tend to
focus on some rather than other aspects of hate speech. So, for
15 See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’,
Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 2320–2381; Charles Lawrence III, ‘If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus’, Duke Law Journal (1990): 431–483; Charles Lawrence III et al., ‘Introduction’,
in M. Matsuda et al. (eds.) Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First
Amendment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Richard Delgado, ‘Toward a Legal Realist View of the
First Amendment’, Harvard Law Review 113 (2000): 778–802; Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A
Philosophical Examination (London: Routledge, 2015), Chap. 3.
16 See, e.g., Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Must We Defend Nazis? Hate Speech, Pornography, and
The First Amendment (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997), p. 129; David Brink, ‘Millian
Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech’, Legal Theory 7 (2001): 119–157, p. 119; Bhikhu
Parekh, ‘Hate Speech: Is There a Case for Banning?’, Public Policy Research 12 (2005–2006): 213–223, p.
223; Brown, Hate Speech Law, Chap. 6.
17 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate’, Harvard Law Review
123 (2010): 1596–1657, pp. 1621–1623; Brown, Hate Speech Law, Chap. 5.
18 See, e.g., Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York, NY: Routledge,
1997), p. 77; Robert Post, ‘Hate Speech’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) Extreme Speech and Democracy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 127–136.
19 See, e.g., Charles Lawrence III, ‘Cross Burning and the Sound of Silence: Anti-Subordination
Theory and the First Amendment’, Villanova Law Review 37 (1992): 787–804, pp. 792, 800; Erik Bleich,
The Freedom to Be Racist? How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 12–13; Brown, Hate Speech Law, Chap. 7. Alexander Brown,
‘Hate Speech Laws, Legitimacy, and Precaution: A Reply to James Weinstein’, Constitutional Com-
mentary, forthcoming. Cf. James Weinstein and Ivan Hare, ‘General Introduction: Free Speech,
Democracy, and the Suppression of Extreme Speech Past and Present’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.)
Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 4.
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example, when critical race theorists use the term ‘racist hate speech’
with a view to emphasising the harmful effects of everyday racist
speech on members of historically oppressed or victimised groups,
this leads to a conception of hate speech that foregrounds the use of
insults, slurs, epithets, and also threatening signs and symbols, par-
ticularly in face-to-face encounters.20 To take another example, it is
because Waldron has a core interest in the role the term ‘hate
speech’ might play in identifying forms of speech that threaten
people’s sense that they are members of society in good standing
that he feels compelled to conceive of hate speech in terms of group
libel.21 Finally, James Weinstein and Ivan Hare are interested in the
job that the term ‘hate speech’ and related terms – such as ‘extreme
speech’ – can perform in identifying forms of speech ‘that many
believe pose an unacceptable threat to essential values in modern
multicultural democracies, or in some cases, to democracy itself’.22
This in turn means that they characterise hate speech as ‘inciting
others to hatred of the target group or seeking to encourage the
audience to discriminate against them’.23 Now these analyses might
be well-motivated in virtue of the assumptions made about the
respective purposes served by the term ‘hate speech’, but this does
not mean they cannot be criticised. A conception of hate speech
might be criticised as being under- or over-inclusive given the job it
is designed to do, for example.24
A much broader job performed by the term ‘hate speech’ is
simply to express disapproval of certain forms of speech. It is not
merely an evaluative term but also a pejorative term in that sense.
When we describe something as ‘hate speech’ we intend this to be a
form of condemnation, invariably of the speech but also sometimes
of the speaker.25 It is a kind of speech that deserves censure. In order
20 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, pp. 2332, 2335, 2358; Lawrence, ‘If He
Hollers Let Him Go’, p. 452; Lawrence, ‘Cross Burning and the Sound of Silence’, pp. 787–788;
Lawrence et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 1; Delgado, ‘Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment’,
pp. 786–789.
21 See, e.g., Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, pp. 1597, 1600–1601.
22 Weinstein and Hare, ‘General Introduction’, p. 4.
23 Ibid.
24 For a challenge to the narrowness of Waldron’s characterisation of hate speech, see Brown, Hate
Speech Law, Chap. 5.
25 See, e.g., Boromisza-Habashi, ‘Hate speech’, p. 715.
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for something to count as hate speech given the aforementioned
purpose, therefore, it must be the sort of thing that is worthy of
disapproval or condemnation; otherwise the concept is not doing
one of the jobs that we expect it to do. Of course, the job of
expressing disapproval of certain forms of speech is performed by
many terms besides ‘hate speech’. Think of ‘unjust speech’, ‘dan-
gerous speech’, ‘ill-considered speech’, and ‘harmful speech’. Then
again, the term ‘hate speech’ seems to be particularly powerful in the
present climate. We tend to reserve the term for forms of speech
that we have special reason to be intolerant of within diverse soci-
eties. This perhaps explains why people engaged in hotly contested
debates surrounding institutional racism, religious intolerance, sexual
and transgender politics, national identity and immigration, or dis-
ability rights, to name but a few, sometimes resort to accusing the
other side of engaging in ‘hate speech’. Consider the arrests and
subsequent acquittals of the Kenyan politicians Moses Kuria and
Junet Mohamed on suspicion of inciting hatred, both of whom
claimed innocence but also accused the other of guilt.26
However, one danger with linking the meaning of the term ‘hate
speech’ to the job of expressing moral disapproval is that some users
will use the term to refer to forms of speech that perhaps only they
and few others believe are worthy of disapproval or condemnation.
What is more, dominant sections of society or in some instances
undemocratic, authoritarian and oppressive governments might ex-
ploit the term ‘hate speech’ not merely to condemn the speech of
others but to discredit or silence the speech of people with whom
they simply disagree. They use the term ‘hate speech’ not merely to
censure but also to censor. If the term ‘hate speech’ is being used by
such groups to perform these jobs, the result may be a significant
disbenefit for society as a whole, in terms of chilling or restricting
legitimate forms of self-expression, public discourse, and dissent.27
By way of illustration, some notable civil libertarian scholars in the
United States have suggested that the term ‘hate speech’ is being
used by governmental authorities and liberal elites to enforce a
26 Unkown, ‘MPs Moses Kuria and Waititu Acquitted of Hate Speech Charges’, Capital News,
February 20, 2017. Available at www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/02/mps-moses-kuria-waititu-
acquitted-hate-speech-charges/.
27 See, e.g., Boromisza-Habashi, Speaking Hatefully; Kenan Malik, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P.
Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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particular type of ideology that prizes political correctness over
freedom of expression.28 Much the same suggestion has been made
by some writers in Europe who have been publically accused of
engaging in hate speech or who have been prosecuted for, or fear
that they might be prosecuted for, engaging in hate speech. Writing
in the left-wing Hungarian newspaper, Népszabadság, in 1996, for
example, the Hungarian revisionist historian Mária Schmidt claimed
that the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ ‘can perhaps only be
compared to concepts like class enemy or enemy of the people, and
its construction is downright Orwellian’.29 In a similar vein, consider
this passage taken from an article posted on a Holocaust denial
website by the anti-Zionist activist Michael Rivero. ‘These phrases,
‘hate speech’ and ‘anti-Semite’, are well-worn devices to shut up a
critic of Israel without having to answer the criticisms.’30 Likewise,
many on the Christian right in the United States affirm that the term
‘hate speech’ is synonymous with a liberal attack on literalist inter-
pretations of the Bible’s teaching on homosexuality. In a recent
interview with CBN News the Republican Senator Marco Rubio
declared, ‘If you think about it, we are at the water’s edge of the
argument that mainstream Christian teaching is hate speech.’31 A
note posted on the website of the Westboro Baptist Church puts a
similar point even more forcefully. ‘Just because you rage against
God and make laws that say you cannot use ‘hate speech’ (a/k/a –
you may not speak of the Bible standards) in the UK does NOT
mean you will not get the message that God Almighty intends for
you to get.’32 Then again, it seems equally likely that the story being
told by some civil libertarians about how governmental authorities
and liberal elites have been using the concept hate speech to silence
valuable speech and precious forms of dissent are themselves using
the term ‘so-called hate speech’ to do a job the social value of which
28 See, e.g., Henry Louis Gates, ‘War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment’, in
H. Gates et al. (eds.) Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (New
York, NY: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 17–18; C. Edwin Baker, ‘Hate Speech’, in M. Herz and
P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 73.
29 Cited in Boromisza-Habashi, Speaking Hatefully, p. 84.
30 Available at http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/hatespeech.html.
31 David Brody, ‘Rubio Warns of ‘Clear, Present Danger’ to Christianity’, CBN, May 26, 2015.
Available at www.cbn.com/cbnnews/politics/2015/May/Rubio-Warns-of-Clear-Present-Danger-to-Chr
istianity/.
32 Available at www.godhatesfags.com.
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can also be called into question, namely, the job of defending
indefensible forms of speech. And maybe the claim that university
campus codes designed to combat racist hate speech are political
correctness gone mad is itself, as John K. Wilson puts it, part of a
‘melodrama’ staged by conservatives to attack codes they simply do
not like.33 And perhaps the fundamentalist or evangelical Christian
view that laws banning incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual
orientation are a form of religious persecution are themselves an
indirect attempt to incite or justify discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation.
This means that if we want to get at the meaning of the ordinary
concept hate speech through the use of purpose-oriented conceptual
analyses, then tough choices will have to be made about what jobs
or purposes can be deemed relevant (because beneficial) and,
therefore, what things the search for meaning ought to capture or
take its lead from.34 Assuming that the aforementioned allegations
and counter-allegations about the types of malign jobs which the
term ‘hate speech’ is being used to perform are accurate, then per-
haps we should not tailor our characterisations of the meaning of
that term to all jobs, and certainly not to the job of ideologically-
motivated censorship, but instead to jobs that are objectively bene-
ficial for society as a whole.
At any rate, one upshot of appealing to this sort of analysis is that
we are likely to end up with more than one appropriate purpose or
function for the concept hate speech. What is more, a plurality of
purposes or functions is likely to produce a plurality of meanings.
Even if we just focus on (1) highlighting forms of harmful speech, (2)
flagging up socially divisive forms of speech, (3) identifying forms of
speech that can undermine people’s sense of equality, (4) articulating
civility norms, and (5) labelling up forms of speech that undermine
democracy, we are likely to end up with a family of different
meanings of the term ‘hate speech’, each slightly different to the
next. My own view, to be articulated more fully in Section VII, is
that we should embrace rather than resist this outcome, and thereby
jettison the assumption that if we only look hard enough we can find
only one purpose and a single definition.
33 John K. Wilson, The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher Education
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 91.
34 Cf. Fisher, ‘Meanings and Methodologies’, p. 60.
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IV. FOLK PLATITUDES ANALYSIS
Folk platitudes analysis, as I shall mean it, is the identification and
examination of commonplace generalisations or folk platitudes held
about the term or concept in question.35 Some folk platitudes about
hate speech are shared across many different countries or socio-legal
communities, whereas others are idiosyncratic to just one or two
countries or cultural communities. The method takes these folk
platitudes as things that ought to be taken seriously, but it also
recognises that these folk platitudes can be mistaken. They tend to
be affirmed by people before they have been exposed to more de-
tailed and rigorous thinking about the nature of hate speech,
including the method of comparing and contrasting different plati-
tudes, and before they have been invited to think about more
unusual examples or unusual ways of thinking about run of the mill
examples.
What, if any, folk platitudes exist about the ordinary concept hate
speech? In what follows I shall examine four such platitudes. The first
is that ‘hate speech’ is an evaluative term in the sense that one
cannot, at least with sincerity or without irony, label something ‘hate
speech’ without thereby passing a negative normative judgement
upon it, in the same way one cannot call something ‘unjust’ without
thereby claiming it to be a bad thing. That the term ‘hate speech’ is
negatively evaluative is also suggested by the accompanying lan-
guage that people use to refer to the extent of hate speech or to
increasing levels of hate speech or to the way hate speech is spread.
It is not uncommon for people, including academics, to refer to an
‘epidemic’36 or ‘contagion’37 of hate speech. If the term ‘hate speech’
did not signal something that was morally bad or at least unwel-
come, then such metaphors would seem rather incoherent. The fact
that they are not jarring or peculiar sounding is telling. After all, we
rarely, if ever, talk of epidemics or contagions of apple pie. But can it
really be the case that all uses of the term ‘hate speech’ imply a
negative evaluation of the speech in question? Do not people – critics
of hate speech law in particular – sometimes use locutions such as
35 Ibid., p. 63.
36 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, pp. 2332, 2370.
37 See, e.g., Stephen L. Newman, ‘Should Hate Speech be Allowed on the Internet? A Reply to
Raphael Cohen-Almagor’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2 (2010): 119–123, p. 120.
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‘so-called hate speech’ or ‘what is commonly referred to as ‘hate
speech’’ when talking about forms of speech that they believe are
not entirely a bad thing or at least not bad enough to warrant legal
prohibition or that they believe could be valuable in certain ways?
They might say, ‘So-called hate speech serves an important function
in society by allowing people to let off steam verbally rather than
engaging in acts of violence and, what is more, provides the rest of
society with a window into the minds of racists which generally
speaking is a good thing if we want to know how to tackle racism.’
Or, ‘What is commonly referred to as ‘hate speech’ in fact includes
various forms of artistic, political, religious and dissenting speech –
all of which is vitally important in maintaining vibrant and diverse
public discourse.’ On the other hand, arguably even in such cases
people are implicitly acknowledging the fact that the ordinary, non-
ironic meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ involves a negative con-
notation. It is this accepted connotation that they are seeking to
challenge in some way.
A second, much less straightforward folk platitude is that hate
speech is about certain types of people. Ordinarily we would not, I
think, use the term ‘hate speech’ to describe the words of someone
who expresses loathing of mosquitoes, who makes false claims about
the cleanliness of rats, or who spreads negative stereotypes about
vultures, for instance. By the same token, we tend not to count as
hate speech generalised misanthropic speech that denigrates or vili-
fies the entire human race.38 Nevertheless, the mere fact that speech
is about or directed at particular human beings is not enough to
make it hate speech. The concept fighting talk also pertains to speech
directed at human beings only, yet not all fighting talk is hate speech.
It seems that genuine hate speech has to do with members of groups
or classes of persons identified by only certain characteristics. But
which ones? Here the platitude does not provide a definitive answer.
If pressed, language users could provide lists of characteristics, and
perhaps many of these lists would include race, ethnicity, religion,
sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability. But it is uncertain
whether such lists would define the limits of the concept. Take the
South Park episode from 2005 in which Cartman’s school presenta-
tion about ‘ginger kids’ – who it is claimed are suffering from ‘gin-
38 Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214.
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gervitis’ and have ‘no souls’ – causes Kyle to object, ‘That’s not a
lecture, it’s a hate speech.’39 This speech is insulting or disparaging
about people with a particular type of hair colour, but we do not, I
think, balk at Kyle’s usage. It is not entirely clear who we are sup-
posed to be laughing at here, but even if there is something
humorous about the scene, the use of the term ‘hate speech’ does
not seem unintelligible. Perhaps it makes sense to us because hair
colour is being used as a proxy for some form of racial or ethnic
group identity. Then again, what if it is exactly what it appears to be,
a hate speech about people with ginger coloured hair? This example
would then suggest that the concept is applicable to more charac-
teristics than our putatively definitive list had assumed.40
Consider two other hard cases for this platitude. First, think about
cases where someone expressly denies that a certain group of people
are human beings. Consider this utterance (which has been attrib-
uted to Adolf Hitler): ‘The Jews are undoubtedly a race, but they are
not human.’ Is this a counter-example to the folk platitude that hate
speech is always about or against human beings? I would argue not.
The folk platitude belongs to and is about the actual world, a world
in which Jews are human, as opposed to a possible world in which
Jews are not human. The key issue is that the folk platitude holds
true in the actual world, so whether or not it holds true in a possible
world in which Jews are not human is moot. Here in the actual
world the utterance is about human beings and it is hate speech. Of
course, there may be people who believe that Jews are not human.
And no doubt such people might also believe that the above utter-
ance is not hate speech. But I simply take it as read that such people
are mistaken on both counts.
Another hard case is speech that denigrates a set of religious
beliefs and practices or that defiles the reputation of someone who
embodied those beliefs and practices such as a religious prophet.
Consider Salman Rushdie’s 1988 book The Satanic Verses or Kurt
Westergaard’s cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in the
39 South Park, Season 9, Episode 11, aired on Comedy Central US, November 9, 2005.
40 For a discussion of the numerous characteristics that governments could potentially deem ‘pro-
tected’ for the purposes of hate speech law, see Alexander Brown, ‘The ‘Who?’ Question in the Hate
Speech Debate: Part 1: Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches’, Canadian Journal of Law &
Jurisprudence 29 (2016): 275–320; and Alexander Brown, ‘The ‘Who?’ Question in the Hate Speech
Debate: Part 2: Functional and Democratic Approaches’, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 30
(2017): 23–55.
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Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005. Ostensibly both examples
of speech are about a religion and its prophet rather than about a
group or class of persons identified by the protected characteristic of
religion. And so there may be a tendency to want to not count them
as cases of hate speech.41 Then again, it could be that the semantics
of such speech are deeper or more complex than they at first appear.
Maybe some statements about or caricatured depictions of the Pro-
phet Muhammad actually are about all Muslims or at least are of
Muslims in general, and amount to negative stereotypes, stigmati-
sation, or even defamation.42 As such, they can be counted as hate
speech. Thus it is feasible that a cartoon depicting the Prophet
Muhammad as a terrorist or suicide bomber has something close to
the following semantic content, ‘Muslims follow the Quran, a book
that commands them to emulate Muhammad, but he was a violent,
vengeful man, who waged wars against his neighbours, terrorised
poets, and beat his own bride, so it is no surprise that all Muslims
throughout the world continue to behave in these ways.’
Turning to a third folk platitude that also needs to be handled
with great caution, of those ordinary people who have come across
the term ‘hate speech’ before, or are being confronted with it for the
first time, I suspect that many would simply assume that hate speech
necessarily has something to do with emotions, feelings, or attitudes
of hate or hatred. In ‘The Myth of Hate’ I put forward numerous
counter-examples: examples of what we might intuitively call ‘hate
speech’ that lacked this essential involvement with or necessary
connection to hate or hatred.
Perhaps a large part of what fuels this myth is that some forms of
hate speech are intimately connected to or bound up with emotions,
feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. For example, in the case of
incitement to hatred the word ‘hatred’ more likely than not does
carry its ordinary or literal meaning. Indeed, what is so troubling
41 See, e.g., Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 215; Robert Post, ‘Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits
of Muhammad’, Constellations 12 (2007): 72–90, p. 84; Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, pp. 1612–
1613.
42 See, e.g., Tariq Modood, ‘Muslims, Incitement to Hatred and the Law’, in J. Horton (ed.)
Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Toleration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 145; Tariq Modood, ‘The
Liberal Dilemma: Integration or Vilification?’, International Migration 44 (2006): 4–7, p. 4; Tariq Modood,
‘Hate Speech: The Feelings and Beliefs of the Hated’, Contemporary Political Theory 13 (2014): 104–109,
pp. 106–108; Glyn Morgan, ‘Mill’s Liberalism, Security, and Group Defamation’, in G. Newey (ed.)
Freedom of Expression: Counting the Costs (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007), pp. 128–129; Erik
Bleich, ‘On Democratic Integration and Free Speech: Response to Tariq Modood and Randall Hansen’,
International Migration 44 (2006): 17–22, p. 21.
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about incitement to hatred is precisely that it does aim or is likely to
stir up or awaken emotions, feelings, or attitudes of intense or ex-
treme dislike, aversion, loathing, antipathy, enmity or hostility of the
sort that are liable to spill over into acts of discrimination or vio-
lence.43 But incitement to hatred is only one among many different
forms of hate speech. As I shall try to show in Section V, not
everything that is intuitively labelled ‘hate speech’ amounts to
incitement to hatred.
I turn finally to the folk platitude that hate speech is a type of
regulatable speech. This is to think that for the most part hate speech
may be regulated, not that it should be regulated all things consid-
ered. Regulatable speech is contrasted with speech which for the
most part may not be regulated because it enjoys special protection
under a constitutional right to freedom of expression. I do not mean
to claim that this folk platitude is affirmed in every country or socio-
legal community on the planet. Instead, my claim is that it is
probably affirmed in Canada, in many parts of Europe, in Australia,
in parts of Africa, in parts of South America, in parts of Asia and East
Asia, and in some parts of the Middle East. As for exceptions, it is
tempting to assume that Americans share a civil libertarian inter-
pretation of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that says
hate speech is a protected category of speech under the First
Amendment and therefore not a type of regulatable speech consti-
tutionally speaking.44 But this assumption might be premature. For
one thing, there are high-profile shapers of public opinion in the
United States, such as the CNN anchor Chris Cuomo, who have
publicly declared that hate speech is not protected speech under the
First Amendment. Another, admittedly crude, measure of whether
ordinary Americans think that hate speech is regulatable speech is
whether or not they think it should be regulated. The opinion
pollsters Rasmussen Reports and YouGov have both recently pub-
lished online polls about Americans’ attitudes toward the criminali-
43 Cf. Alexander Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006: A Millian Response’, Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2008): 1–24, pp. 5, 13–14; Brown, Hate Speech
Law, pp. 66–71.
44 See Floyd Abrams, ‘On American Hate Speech Law’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content
and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012). Cf. Brown, Hate Speech Law, Chap. 2.
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sation of hate speech.45 These polls indicated low levels of ‘I don’t
know’ responses and even revealed that a small majority support
hate speech laws. Likewise, in 2017 Yougov United Kingdom
undertook a poll of British attitudes to incitement to hatred laws.
This poll revealed strong majority support for such laws.46 These
results would be highly surprising if people thought that hate speech
was nonregulatable.
Arguably the folk platitude that hate speech is a type of regulat-
able speech is consistent with or might even be supported by our
beliefs about the sorts of jobs that we expect the ordinary concept
hate speech to perform. If we believe, for example, that highlighting
forms of speech that disproportionately harm already disadvantaged
or victimised members of society is an important job or role of the
ordinary concept hate speech, then we may be more inclined to accept
that hate speech is a type of regulatable speech. Indeed, when people
who affirm this folk platitude are asked the question, ‘What is it
about hate speech that makes it regulatable?’, one likely answer is
another folk platitude, that hate speech causes harm of one kind or
another, directly or indirectly.47 Does this mean that something can
be counted as hate speech only if it actually causes harm? Not
necessarily. The folk platitude is that hate speech has the tendency to
cause harm – this tendency is one of its features – not that it always
causes harm. And so ordinary language users would, and should, say
‘B was the victim of hate speech and is so often the case he was
harmed by it,’ but they would not normally say, ‘B was the victim of
45 See Rasmussen Reports, ‘31% Favor Ban on Hate Speech’, June 6, 2013. Available at www.
rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/june_2013/31_favor_ban_on_hate_
speech. YouGov Unites States, ‘America Divided on Hate Speech Laws’, October 2, 2014. Available at
https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/10/02/america-divided-hate-speech-laws/. And YouGov
United States, ‘Half of Democrats Support a Ban on Hate Speech’, May 20, 2015. Available at
https://today.yougov.com/news/2015/05/20/hate-speech/.
46 Cited in Alexander Brown, ‘New Evidence Shows Public Supports Banning Hate Speech Against
People With Disabilities’, The Conversation, March 1, 2017. Available at https://theconversation.com/
new-evidence-shows-public-supports-banning-hate-speech-against-people-with-disabilities-73807.
47 See, e.g., Delgado, ‘Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment’, pp. 787–788;
Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements (New
York, NY: New York University Press, 2002), p. 211, n. 1; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Un-
derstanding Words That Wound (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), Chap. 1; Brown, Hate Speech Law,
Chap. 3.
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hate speech, but, as is so often the case, it left him unharmed.’ Note,
this platitude is weaker than the claim hate speech necessarily causes
harm but is stronger than the claim that hate speech is merely capable
of causing harm.48
Returning to the folk platitude about regulatability, if this platitude
is true, then in order for something to count as hate speech it must be
something that we regard as regulatable. Although this folk platitude
may well serve some useful purposes, I also believe that accepting it
may have some potentially undesirable consequences for how we use
the term ‘hate speech’, particularly in countries or socio-legal com-
munities that impose a high threshold on regulatability. Focusing on
hate speech as a type of regulatable speech may, for example, push
some countries or socio-legal communities in the direction of a narrow
conception of the ordinary (as well as the legal) concept hate speech
according to which something is hate speech only if it amounts to
incitement to hatred, discrimination or violence. This reflects two
points. The first, already touched upon, is the importance placed on
the right to freedomof expression inmany legal regimes. This creates a
propensity not to regard speech as regulatable unless it is a special case
or exceptional in some way. The second point is that when the term
‘hate speech’ is put to legal purposes, especially in restricting speech,
there is a need for ‘definitional refinement’49 so that the termmight be
operationalised or justicised. This technical requirement might also
lead some countries or socio-legal communities to reject or discount as
proper instances of hate speech forms of speech that are difficult to
define in statutes, not easily understood and implemented by legal
professionals, including the judiciary, the police, and public prosecu-
tors, and hard to comprehend or grasp by ordinary members of the
public who must be able to reasonably foresee the scope of speech
restrictions. Thus, in countries or socio-legal communities that impose
a relatively high threshold on regulatability, accepting the folk plati-
tude that hate speech is a type of regulatable speech may restrict the
scope of the ordinary concept hate speech to a narrow range of speech,
which may in turn undermine important jobs that anyone might
48 Cf. Katherine Gelber, ‘Reconceptualizing Counter-speech in Hate Speech Policy (with a Focus on
Australia)’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation
and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 213.
49 Tarlach McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis of Council of Europe Strategies for Coun-
tering ‘‘Hate Speech’’’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking
Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 457.
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reasonably expect the concept to do, such as to identify or flag up
forms of speech that disproportionately harm already disadvantaged
or victimised members of society.
What all of the above demonstrates, I think, is the need for
systematic thinking about folk platitudes: placing our folk platitudes
about ordinary concepts hate speech into some kind of coherent or
ordered system along with our beliefs about the important jobs that
we expect those same concepts to do, and of course along with our
linguistic intuitions about cases. Aside from what I have already done
to challenge the folk platitude that hate speech necessarily has
something to do with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or
hatred, I do not attempt here to provide a fully-worked out sys-
tematisation: I confine myself to sketching out the various elements
that it should seek to systematise.
V. INTUITIONS ABOUT CASES ANALYSIS
Intuitions about cases analysis, as I shall understand it, involves
examining intuitions about whether given cases (actual and possible)
are or are not cases of hate speech primarily via linguistic intuitions
about whether using the term ‘hate speech’ to describe given cases
(actual and possible) either seems quite obviously appropriate or
clearly inappropriate. This approach taps into the fact that when
faced with the question, ‘What is hate speech?’, competent users
may simply say, ‘I might not be able to define it exactly, but I know
it when I hear it or read it or see it.’ The relevant intuitions need not
be universally held, but they must be widespread among people who
use the concepts, that is, among ordinary users of the term ‘hate
speech’. Ostensibly, the aim of the analysis is to produce conceptions
or meanings that fit with or preserve the truth of intuitions about
cases. However, although these intuitions are treated as initially
credible, they are not taken to be infallible, meaning that they can
also be shown to be mistaken based on countervailing evidence.
Before I begin I also wish to address two possible objections to
this form of analysis. The first is that it is difficult to get the analysis
off the ground for the simple reason that ‘hate speech’ is a techno-
cratic term which ordinary people rarely use (so the objection goes).
In other words, there is not a stock of standard uses to draw on for
the purposes of triggering linguistic intuitions because this is not a
WHAT IS HATE SPEECH?
mainstream term. However, I reject the premise of the argument. At
the start of ‘The Myth of Hate’ I provided evidence of how the term
‘hate speech’ has entered into ordinary language, mainstream media,
and popular culture. It is no longer merely a legalistic or technocratic
term. Moreover, even if ordinary language users do not hear or read
or use the term ‘hate speech’ on a daily basis, they may nevertheless
have some grasp of its meanings and may have intuitions, even if
implicit, about whether or not it is appropriately applied to given
cases simply based on the fact that they use it now and then.
A second possible objection is that the method of looking at ordi-
nary language is irredeemably conservative. Insofar as the method
looks at, as Herbert Marcuse puts it, the ‘totalitarian scope of the
established universe of discourse’,50 it is bound to reinforce not only
the linguistic practices of the society in question – in the present case
practices surrounding the use of the term ‘hate speech’ – but also the
wider array of social, political, and legal practices that support, and are
supported by, those linguistic practices – such as the practice of pro-
hibiting or not prohibiting hate speech. However, as AlanWertheimer
has argued, there is no necessary connection between documenting
and identifying patterns (and sometimes confusions) within standard
everyday uses of language, on the one hand, and accepting or justifying
those linguistic practices, much less accepting or justifying the wider
array of social, political, and legal practices that support, and are sup-
ported by, those linguistic practices, on the other hand.51 Indeed,
according to Marcuse himself, linguistic analysis could support reform
of the status quo if particular attention is paid to ‘ordinary language in
really controversial areas’, and if the ambition is to uncover ‘muddled
thinking where it seems to be the least muddled, uncovering the
falsehood in somuch normal and clear usage’.52 Surely if this applies to
anything it applies to analysis of the term ‘hate speech’, including using
intuitions about cases to challenge folk platitudes such as that hate
speech necessarily has something to do with emotions, feelings, or
attitudes of hate or hatred.
Now for the analysis itself. There are, I think, at least five broad
types of speech that intuitively fall under the ordinary concept hate
50 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 195.
51 Alan Wertheimer, ‘Is Ordinary Language Analysis Conservative?’, Political Theory 4 (1976): 405–
422, p. 410.
52 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 195.
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speech and that are plausibly called ‘hate speech’. Before setting out
the types, however, I first need to make some clarifications. The five
broad types of hate speech are not intended to be mutually exclusive:
some forms of speech fall into more than one of the types. In
addition, I do not pretend that this list of five types is exhaustive such
that something is hate speech only if it is an instance of one or more
of these types. There may well by other types. Indeed, it is quite
possible that these broad types could be carved up differently, cre-
ating a much longer list potentially. In addition, I am not suggesting
that these types all share some common quality or universal feature
over and above the quality of being hate speech. So nothing is being
assumed here about the essence of hate speech. Rather, the purpose
of setting out the different types is simply to illuminate something of
the equivocal semantics of the term ‘hate speech’.
First, I suspect that most users of the term ‘hate speech’ would, if
asked, apply the term to insults, slurs, epithets, ethnophaulisms,
antilocutions, or other words of disparaging abuse or vilification
targeted at members of groups or classes of persons identified by
protected characteristics. Consider people who direct ethnophau-
lisms like ‘black bastard’, homophobic slurs like ‘dirty faggot’, or
xenophobic epithets such as ‘cockroach’ or ‘bogus asylum-seeking’ at
other people whom they perceive to possess certain characteristics.53
Legal scholars,54 social psychologists,55 linguists,56 and philoso-
phers57 alike have identified such speech as paradigmatic hate
speech. I do not have space here to discuss in detail different theories
of the semantics of slurs and epithets, but I shall briefly mention
three leading accounts. On the first, slurs express, encode, implicate
53 Countless other examples could be mentioned, of course. Indeed, the sociolinguist and lexicog-
rapher Irving Allen classifies ethnic or racial slurs into six categories: physical traits, personal traits,
personal names, food habits, group names, and other (miscellaneous). See his The Language of Ethnic
Conflict: Social Organization and Lexical Culture (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
54 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2332; Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words:
Individuals, Communities and Liberties of Speech (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 47;
Delgado, ‘Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment’, p. 786; Steven J. Heyman, Free Speech
and Human Dignity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 165; Douglas M. Fraleigh and
Joseph S. Tuman, Freedom of Expression in the Marketplace of Ideas (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011),
p. 139.
55 See, e.g., Brian Mullen and Tirza Leader, ‘Linguistic Factors: Antilocutions, Ethnonyms, Ethno-
phaulisms, and Other Varieties of Hate Speech’, in J. F. Dovidio et al. (eds.) On the Nature of Prejudice
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 192.
56 See, e.g., Geoffrey Hughes, An Encyclopedia of Swearing: The Social History of Oaths, Profanity, Foul
Language, and Ethnic Slurs in the English-Speaking World (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 220.
57 See, e.g., Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1600.
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or connote derogatory ideas or negative stereotypes about or per-
taining to the subject of the slur.58 So ‘Black bastard’ might have the
semantic or locutionary content, ‘lazy, stupid, aggressive, criminal
good for nothing black person,’ whereas ‘dirty fagot’ could mean
‘effeminate, promiscuous, sexually confused, sexually deviant, dan-
gerous, HIV-carrying gay person’ and ‘bogus asylum-seeking’ could
connote ‘lying, untrustworthy, unwanted economic migrant’. On a
second approach, a slur functions semantically to derogate, dispar-
age, or cast aspersions on the object of the slur. And so the slur
‘nigger’, for instance, means or includes within its semantic content
‘African American and despicable because of it’.59 A third account
maintains that slurs include within their semantic content the fact
that the speaker possesses certain emotions, feelings, or attitudes,
such as contempt, disdain or scorn, toward the objects of the slurs,
and intends to use the slurs to express these states; to express the
way the speaker looks on the objects of the slurs as worthless or
beneath consideration.60 So the slur ‘Yao Ming is a Chink’ means the
following, ‘The speaker believes that Yao Ming is Chinese, the
speaker identifies being Chinese as part of what Yao Ming is, the
speaker holds Yao Ming in contempt on account of being Chinese,
and the speaker intends to express this contempt.’61
Second, most people, it seems to me, would also class as hate
speech any forms of speech or expressive conduct that express or
articulate ideas relating to the moral inferiority, lowness, non-hu-
manity or alienness of members of historically oppressed or vic-
timised groups or perhaps members of any groups identified by
protected characteristics.62 This broad type of speech includes speech
58 See, e.g., Lynne Tirrell, ‘Racism, Sexism, and the Inferential Role Theory of Meaning’, in C.
Hendricks and K. Oliver (eds.) Language and Liberation: Feminism, Philosophy, and Language. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1999). Cf. Robin Jeshion, ‘Slurs and Stereotypes’, Analytic Philosophy
54 (2013): 314–325.
59 See, e.g., Christopher Hom, ‘The Semantics of Racial Epithets’, Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008):
416–440, p. 416.
60 See, e.g., Jeshion, ‘Slurs and Stereotypes’; Robin Jeshion, ‘Slurs, Dehumanization, and the
Expression of Contempt’, in D. Sosa (ed.) Bad Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Cf. Hom, ‘The Semantics of Racial Epithets’; Elisabeth Camp, ‘Slurring Perspectives’, Analytic Philosophy
54 (2013): 330–349.
61 See, e.g., Jeshion, ‘Slurs and Stereotypes’, pp. 240–243.
62 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2333; Molefi Kete Asante, ‘Identifying
Racist Language: Linguistic Acts and Signs’, in M. Hecht (ed.) Communicating prejudice (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, 1998), p. 92; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214; Kevin W. Saunders, Degradation: What the History
of Obscenity Tells Us About Hate Speech (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2011), pp. 100, 132;
Musolff, ‘Dehumanizing Metaphors in UK Immigrant Debates in Press and Online Media’, p. 49.
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that: ranks certain groups or classes of persons as morally inferior;
compares them to non-human animals or to parasitic creatures; casts
them as alien or not of (or belonging to) this world; draws con-
nections between ascriptive characteristics and low distinctions of
merit, dignity, status, and personhood. Consider this racist utterance,
‘In my opinion blacks have depraved souls, they engage in acts of
savagery, they are not part of the human species; so it is safe to say
that whenever I come across them I know they don’t merit my
concern as moral beings, still less my admiration, trust, and friend-
ship.’ Or consider an image, sign, caricature or symbol (including an
audio symbol) that depicts or represents certain races or ethnic
groups as inferior or degraded – for example, the display of a cari-
cature drawing of a monkey, the holding up of a banana (actual or
plastic), or the making of monkey noises in front of, directed at or
addressed to people who are perceived to be members of certain
races or ethnic groups by people who take themselves to be mem-
bers of a different race or ethnic group.63
Now we also sometimes call such forms of expression ‘hateful
speech’. And it strikes me that when used in this way the term
‘hateful speech’ carries a second meaning, different to the one
identified in ‘The Myth of Hate’. This second meaning has little to
do with the audience’s reactions to speech, and even less with any
feelings of hate or hatred that might be expressed by or motivate its
usage. Instead, it has to do with the locutionary force of the speech,
with what the speech says about members of certain groups. So, for
example, to call racist speech ‘hateful speech’, in this other sense, is
to comment on the ideational content of racist speech, as speech that
conveys ideas relating to the moral inferiority, lowness, non-hu-
manity, or alienness of certain races.64 In other words, we sometimes
use the terms ‘hate speech’ and ‘hateful speech’ to refer to speech
that expresses certain ideas. But notice that here the word ‘hate’ does
not carry its normal meaning (emotions, feelings, or attitudes of
63 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2320; Delgado and Stefancic, Under-
standing Words That Wound, p. 141; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 215.
64 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, pp. 2366–2367; Anthony Lewis, Freedom for
the Thought that We Hate (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 160–163; Corey Brettschneider, ‘Value
Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality: A Theory of Free Speech and Its Implications for the
State Speech and Limited Public Forum Doctrines’, Northwestern University Law Review 107 (2013): 603–
645, p. 610.
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extreme dislike or antipathy). Instead, it is much closer to the con-
cept contempt.
Third, I believe that the average user of the term ‘hate speech’
would look upon group defamation, in the strict sense of making
false damaging statements of fact which diminish the reputation or
good standing of any members of groups or classes of persons
identified by protected characteristics, as hate speech.65 A classic
example is the blood libel of Jews. ‘All the Jews living in this town
are complicit in the practice of kidnapping and murdering the chil-
dren of Christians for the purposes of using their blood for Jewish
holidays and rituals, like in the baking of matzos for Passover or for
re-enacting the crucifixion.’
One common difficulty associated with group defamation as a type
of hate speech is how to establish a connection between making false
statements about a group as a whole andmaking false statements that are
of particular members of the group. But assuming this can be resolved in
particular instances, it does seem intuitive to call some Holocaust
denial hate speech, for example, qua false statements of fact about Jews
(as a group or about individual survivors or witnesses). By contrast, we
would not normally label as ‘hate speech’ statements alleging that the
7/7 London bombings in 2005were a hoax. This is presumably because
the ‘victims’ of this sort of speech are peoplewhowere killed or injured
in the bombings or the friends and family of people who were killed or
injured and this is not a group who share some protected characteristic
over and above the aforementioned. Similarly, if the ‘target’ of state-
ments of the form, ‘The so-called 7/7 London bombings were faked by
the British authorities so as to demonise Muslims and sway public
opinion in favour of their anti-terror policies’ is the British authorities,
then this seems to be more seditious libel than group libel.
It is a further question whether Holocaust denial can be plausibly
labelled ‘hate speech’ even when it is not group defamation. What
are the alternatives? Holocaust denial could also be understood as a
negative stereotype about Jews. It could also be defined not by
semantic content but by the sort of action involved, such as the act
of inciting hatred against Jews or the act of affronting the dignity of
(deceased) Jews. It might instead be classified as a sui generis form of
hate speech. Indeed, some forms of Holocaust denial could poten-
65 See, e.g., L. W. Sumner, ‘Hate Crimes, Literature and Speech’, in R. Frey and C. Heath Wellman
(eds.) A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 142.
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tially be considered something other than hate speech. There is a
growing literature on how best to classify Holocaust denial.66 But
ultimately any plausible classification of Holocaust denial must de-
pend on which particular statements one is talking about.67 Maybe
the following statement is hate speech in virtue of being either a
defamatory statement of particular Jews or a negative stereotype
about all Jews or Jews in general. ‘There were no gas chambers in
German concentration camps during the period of the so-called
Holocaust and the suppression of facts proving this to be the case is
largely the result of a conspiracy perpetrated by certain powerful
Jewish people and their wealthy institutions.’
Fourth, following on from the above example, I suspect that most
ordinary language users would tend to treat as ‘hate speech’ negative
stereotypes or generics about any members of groups or classes of
persons identified by protected characteristics. Negative stereotypes
typically depict people in a bad light. Yet they may not amount to false
statements of fact of the sort that qualify as libel or defamation. This
can be for a variety of reasons.68 It could be because they express
existentially quantified generalisations that are true because they are
only saying that there is at least one member of the group in question
who possess the bad attribute. Or because they express statements of
statistical fact about the prevalence of certain attributes among the
group in question and these statistical facts are true even if they also
present an unbalanced, oversimplified, or misleading impressions of
reality. Or because they express unquantified generalisations that are
sufficiently vague, ambiguous, or metaphysical to make it impossible
to determine whether they are true or false. Consider the following
words published in The Daily Express during the mid-1990s by the TV
personality and politician Robert Kilroy-Silk.
66 See, e.g., Modood, ‘Muslims, Incitement to Hatred and the Law’, p. 145; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p.
215; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance: Studies on the Costs of Free Expression and Freedom of
the Press (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 12, Chap. 7; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Holocaust Denial is a
Form of Hate Speech’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2 (2009): 33–42, p. 35; Kathleen Mahoney, ‘Hate Speech,
Equality, and the State of Canadian Law’, Wake Forest Law Review 44 (2009): 321–351, p. 325; Frederick
Schauer, ‘Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus’, in M. Herz and P.
Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 142–143; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Hate Speech in Constitutional
Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate
Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 246;
Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 96–98.
67 Cf. Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 109–110.
68 Cf. Rae Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, in G. Russell and D. Graff Fara (eds.) Routledge
Companion to the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 760–765.
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Muslims everywhere behave with equal savagery. They behead criminals, stone to
death female – only female – adulteresses, throw acid in the faces of women who
refuse to wear the chador, mutilate the genitals of young girls and ritually abuse
animals.69
At face value these words might be read as universally quantified
generalisations, describing all Muslims. If so, they are patently false.
But faced with accusations of libel, Kilroy-Silk could retort that he
simplymeant to say that all of these things have be done by at least one
Muslim in at least one part of the world where Muslims live. In which
case the generics are actually existentially quantified generalisations,
and they may turn out to be true. Or he means that these acts are,
statistically speaking, more prevalent among Muslims than non-Mus-
lims. Perhaps he could find a few statistics to back up these claims; or at
least some of them. Or maybe he means to assert that these acts are
characteristic properties of being a true Muslim as he conceives it. He
might not be saying that all Muslims partake of these practices; merely
that true Muslims do or that these practices define the essence of being
a Muslim. But as metaphysical statements about what it means to be a
true Muslim, it is hard to decisively judge them true or false. Or
perhaps he simply means to say that these practices among some
Muslims are notable or important practices, even if only a small pro-
portion of actual Muslims engage in these practices and even if these
practices do not define the essence of being a Muslim. If so, then it is
almost impossible to prove that these are not notable or important
practices, things of which notice ought to be taken. Finally, the
meaning of his wordsmay be irredeemably vague and ambiguous, and
so their actual meaning cannot be definitively articulated so as to
support judgements as to truth or falsity.
Fifth, I believe that people intuitively count as hate speech words
or behaviour that, by intention or likelihood, incite, stir up or
advocate hatred, discrimination or violence against members of
groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics, or
that actually threaten violence against such groups, or that simply
justify or glorify discrimination or violence against such groups.70
69 Robert Kilroy-Silk, Daily Express, January 16, 1995.
70 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, ‘Uncoupling Free Speech’, Columbia Law Review 92 (1992): 1321–1357,
p. 1349; Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1; Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance, p. 11; Cohen-
Almagor, ‘Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech’, p. 35; Kylie Weston-Scheuber, ‘Gender and the
Prohibition of Hate Speech’, Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 12 (2012): 132–
150, pp. 139–140.
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Consider the following Islamophobic speech, ‘You think you can
trust Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, and dangerous
people who deserve only our hatred, and when this country is finally
united in its hatred of Muslims, they had better watch out!’ Or, ‘I will
give anyone who kills a Muslim in our Christian land all the money I
have.’ Or, ‘The day that those defenders of our values opened fire in
that mosque was a brilliant day.’
Clearly some instances of hate speech can, and will, fall into more
than one of the aforementioned action sub-types. For example,
sometimes people use threatening words or behaviour in order to stir
up hatred, but in some instances the same language could be further
interpreted as actually threatening discrimination or violence and in
other instances as simply justifying or glorifying discrimination or
violence. Consider signs and symbols signifying historical and ongoing
practices of discrimination or violence directed against members of
minority groups. Commonly cited examples are burning crosses71 and
swastikas.72 The pragmatics of such signs and symbols can be theorised
in different ways depending on the context. It could be that when the
main audience is likeminded or potentially like-minded people, they
function to stir up hatred or to advocate discrimination or violence
against those groups. But when the main audience is members of the
targeted groups, these signs or symbols might serve to actually
threaten discrimination or violence against those people.Or they could
express solidarity with, or sympathy for, certain political regimes,
institutions, and social groups that have perpetrated acts of discrimi-
nation or violence under the banner of the relevant signs or symbols,
and thereby operate to justify or glorify those acts.
What is especially noticeable about this last broad type of hate
speech is the fact that it is speech pragmatics rather than semantics
which makes it distinctive: namely, the focus is more on what people
are doing with the words or symbols they use as opposed to what
they are saying or the ideational content of the words or symbols. In
the next section I shall explore in more detail this general way of
analysing speech, including all types of hate speech.
71 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2321; Lawrence ‘Cross Burning and the
Sound of Silence’, pp. 787–788; Delgado and Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound, p. 141;
Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity, ch. 10; Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1600.
72 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2321; Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech, p. 1;
Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1600.
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VI. ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS
It seems ordinary language users identify examples of hate speech
not merely in virtue of what types of words people use or what types
of things people say with words, but also in virtue of what people do
with words. This implicitly taps into a specific sort of ordinary lan-
guage analysis known as ‘speech act theory’. Drawing on J. L.
Austin’s canonical distinction between three kinds of speech act,73 it
would be hard to deny, I think, that the term ‘hate speech’ can refer
to certain ‘locutionary acts’, the act of saying something by using the
words we do – for example, in calling someone a ‘Chink’ the speaker
might be saying that he holds that person in contempt because he is
Chinese or South East Asian. But it can also refer to ‘illocutionary
acts’, the act of doing something by using the words we do – for
example, through calling someone a ‘Chink’ the speaker might be
performing the act of disparaging that person. And it can refer to
certain ‘perlocutionary acts’, having an impact on another person by
using the words we do – for example, by calling someone a ‘Chink’
the speaker might cause that person to feel disparaged.
To focus on the illocutionary acts, it seems that we can plausibly
use the term ‘hate speech’ to describe a panoply of actions. Some-
times, perhaps often, we consider speech to be hate speech if it
perpetuates or facilitates acts of subordination or oppression.74 We
might also consider speech to be hate speech if it actually constitutes
acts of subordination or oppression.75 Rae Langton identifies hate
speech with various acts of subordination. Signs that read ‘Whites
only’, for example, can serve to ‘rank blacks as having inferior
worth’, ‘legitimate discriminatory behavior on the part of whites’, and
73 See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
74 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, pp. 2332, 2358, 2363.
75 See, e.g., Andrew Altman, ‘Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical Examination’,
Ethics 103 (1993): 302–317, pp. 309–310; Rae Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’, Philosophy
and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 293–330, p. 303; Rae Langton, ‘Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech
and Pornography’, in I. Maitra and M. McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 74–77; Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, pp. 757–760;
Ishani Maitra, ‘Subordinating Speech’, in I. Maitra and M. McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Contro-
versies Over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 96–118; Mary Kate McGowan, ‘On
‘Whites Only’ Signs and Racist Hate Speech: Verbal Acts of Racial Discrimination’, in I. Maitra and M.
McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),
p. 122; Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 75–86.
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‘deprive blacks of some important powers: for example, the power to
go to certain areas’.76 Racist propaganda espousing the inferiority of
certain races ‘incites and promotes racial discrimination, hatred and
violence’.77 Hate speech ‘can be an illocution that persecutes and
degrades’.78 And when targeted at or addressed to a person or small
group of persons hate speech can be an ‘assault, insult, threat’.79 In a
similar vein, Vasu Reddy contends that homophobic hate speech is ‘a
discourse of power, dominance and control which is not merely a
form of patriarchal oppression, but a kind of performative commu-
nication that produces a discourse about homosexuals in order to
misrecognise them.’80 On this kind of analysis, then, to engage in
hate speech is not merely to speak, it is also to perform a ‘speech
act’81 or to participate in a ‘social practice’.82 To further emphasise
the performative nature of hate speech, some writers have coined
the term ‘assaultive speech’ as an alternative to ‘hate speech’.83
What is much less certain, however, is which particular speech
acts are and are not synonymous with hate speech. Some writers
identify hate speech with harming or inciting discrimination or vio-
lence84 or inciting persecution.85 Brison characterises hate speech in
terms of acts of vilifying, intimidating, defaming, and inciting hatred.86
For her part, Katherine Gelber suggests that hate speech can be
defined in terms of acts of disempowering, marginalising, and silenc-
ing.87 These lists provide a good starting point but they are surely not
exhaustive, nor intended to be so. Using speech act analysis we
might come to the conclusion that the word ‘nigger’, for instance,
can be used potentially to perform any or all of the acts on the
76 Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’, p. 303. See also Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 75–86.
77 Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, p. 758.
78 Ibid.
79 Langton, ‘Beyond Belief’, p. 77.
80 Vasu Reddy, ‘Perverts and Sodomites: Homophobia as Hate Speech in Africa’, Southern African
Linguistics and Applied Language Studies 20 (2002): 163–175, p. 164.
81 Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, p. 758; Langton, ‘Beyond Belief’, p. 77.
82 Lawrence et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 1.
83 Ibid. For a more critical examination of just how, and whether or not in fact, hate speech typically
has the illocutionary force it is thought to have, see Butler, Excitable Speech.
84 Schauer, ‘Uncoupling Free Speech’, p. 1349.
85 Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1.
86 Susan Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, Ethics (1998) 108: 312–339, p. 313; Susan
Brison, ‘Hate Speech’, in H. La Follette (ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013), p. 2332.
87 Gelber, ‘Reconceptualizing Counter-speech in Hate Speech Policy’, p. 213.
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aforementioned lists plus a range of other acts including but not
limited to insulting, disparaging, degrading, humiliating, disheartening,
harassing, persecuting, threatening, provoking, or inciting hatred, dis-
crimination or violence. A similarly long and varied list might be rel-
evant to the act of burning crosses no doubt. But other forms of hate
speech might have their own partly overlapping and partly unique
lists. I have myself argued that some forms of hate speech can
amount to various kinds of misrecognising.88
It is also worth remembering at this stage that speech act theory
incorporates not only a classification of speech acts but also an
examination of the grammatical or syntactic properties of words
along with critical reflection on whether there are any good reasons
for their having these properties based on what we want to do with
words. For example, the term ‘hate speech’ remains only a noun in
English. It is not a verb; which is to say, few, if any, ordinary lan-
guage users have taken to using the verb ‘to hate speak against’. So
the pressing question is whether there is any good reason why the
term ‘hate speech’ itself is currently only used as a noun and not a
verb given that to engage in hate speech can be to do things which
can be described using the following verbs, ‘to insult’, ‘to degrade’,
‘to defame’, ‘to negatively stereotype’, ‘to incite hatred, discrimina-
tion or violence’.
Perhaps some people will argue that there are already verb-
equivalents of the term ‘hate speech’ in common usage, such as ‘to
hate on’. Yet this verb is used in relation to criticising anyone or
saying derogatory things about anyone in a public way, and not
necessarily about members of certain groups based on protected
characteristics. Likewise, when people use the verbs ‘to speak ill of’
and ‘to speak against’ someone there is no limitation or restriction
on the type of person being spoken ill of or spoken against. But the
semantics of the term ‘hate speech’ would seem to imply that the
verb ‘to hate speak of’ or ‘to hate speak against’ could only be used
properly in relation to groups or classes of persons identified by
protected characteristics. So in order to be accurate the relevant verb
would need to be something like ‘to hate speak against members of
groups or classes of people identified by protected characteristics’.
Perhaps, then, we should also keep in mind Austin’s insistence that
88 Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 166–174.
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‘ordinary language is not the last word: in principle, it can every-
where be supplemented and improved upon and superseded’.89
That being said, it will require further analysis to explain what
actions are and are not connected with this new verb.90 And this,
arguably, is where insights from both philosophy and sociolinguistics
becomes important: it is a matter of documenting and analysing our
existing uses of the term ‘hate speech’ to identify the sorts of acts
that this term is and is not commonly used in connection with.
Interestingly, Austin is also clear that philosophers and linguists
engaged in the analysis of normative concepts should avail them-
selves of the law as another rich source of cases and uses of lan-
guage.91 And it is not hard to find examples of legal documents,
particularly in the field of human rights, which analyse hate speech
in terms of some of the aforementioned speech acts.92 Consider the
Council of Europe’s characterisation of hate speech as forms of
expression that ‘spread’, ‘incite’, ‘promote’, ‘justify’.93
VII. FAMILY RESEMBLANCES
In this section I want to defend the claim that the concept hate speech
is what Wittgenstein called a ‘family resemblances’ concept.94
According to Wittgenstein, the crucial point about family resem-
blances concepts like the concept game, for example, is that someone
can be a competent user of the relevant term even if he or she
cannot articulate a precise definition of that term (a set of necessary
and jointly sufficient conditions for its correct usage) because the
term does not admit of such a definition.95 What really matters is
that someone knows how to be a participant in the joint activity of
using the term. Coming to have this knowledge involves being ex-
posed to other users. As well as identifying the key features of the
89 J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57
(1956–1957): 1–30, p. 11.
90 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
91 Ibid., pp. 11–14.
92 Cf. Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, p. 758.
93 Recommendation No. R (97) 20, 30 October, 1997, Appendix. Available at www.coe.int/t/dghl/
standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/dh-lgbt_docs/CM_Rec(97)20_en.pdf.
94 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 36 [67].
95 Note, however, the mere fact that the user lacks the knowledge does not prove that the necessary
condition does not exist. See, e.g., Sorin Bangu, ‘Later Wittgenstein on Essentialism, Family Resem-
blance and Philosophical Method’, Metaphysica 6 (2005): 53–73.
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joint activity, the present form of conceptual analysis also involves
identifying sets of overlapping similarities that connect otherwise
disparate examples of the given concept. In what follows I shall try to
show that this method provides not only an illuminating way of
understanding what Matsuda and other writers were doing when
they provided examples of hate speech back in the late 1980s, but
also a way of mapping and accounting for the internal diversity of
hate speech.
Of course, it might be countered right off the bat that the project
of analysing the ordinary concept hate speech requires at least some
minimal characterisation of the term ‘hate speech’ which ordinary
language users agree upon (explicitly or implicitly) even if their usage
admits of a family of meanings. Otherwise the philosopher could not
be sure that it is broadly one and the same concept that people have
in mind when they use the term ‘hate speech’. Yet some writers
doubt the existence of even this shared minimal characterisation.96
However, it seems to me that this role could be, and probably is,
played by paradigmatic examples or exemplars of hate speech –
examples that any competent user of the term ‘hate speech’ is apt to
classify as hate speech with little or no hesitation. What follows is a
series of rational judgements, implicit or explicit, by ordinary lan-
guage users that their use of the term ‘hate speech’ in any given case
captures at least one important similarity with one or more
paradigmatic examples. And this is surely part of what it might mean
to say that hate speech is a family resemblances concept.
Based on everything I have said in this article and in ‘The Myth of
Hate’, my working hypothesis is that even competent users of the
term ‘hate speech’ lack knowledge of a set of necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for appropriately calling something ‘hate
speech’. Now there are particular qualities, features, or descriptive
properties that can be found in some or even in many examples of
hate speech. Even so, these are not always present, and are not
necessary conditions for applying the concept. For example, al-
though many examples of hate speech involve verbal speech, many
do not; many are about or against members of groups or classes of
persons identified by race, yet there are also countless examples of
non-racist hate speech; many instances of hate speech constitute
96 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, ‘Going in Circles with Hate Speech’, The New York Times, November 12,
2012. Available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/going-in-circles-with-hate-speech/.
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incitement to hatred and, then again, many do not. Nevertheless,
what if we say that something is hate speech if and only if it is verbal
or written speech or a symbol, gesture, or play, and is an insult or
the expression of an idea relating to moral inferiority or defamation
or a negative stereotype or the act of insulting or degrading or
persecuting or threatening or inciting hatred, discrimination or vio-
lence against members of groups or classes or persons identified by
their race or ethnicity or religion or nationality or gender or sexual
orientation or disability? Surely this would mean that we have for-
mulated a necessary condition: we are saying that all examples of
hate speech share a complex disjunctive property.
However, there is something unsatisfying or inadequate about
this suggestion. For one thing, we seem to want to know what
single, simple quality or feature or descriptive property is common to
all things that fall under the concept. The disjunctive property does
not fit the bill of providing this essence.97 Also, we might think that
there is something coherent about the concept hate speech that makes
it unlike any number of incoherent concepts we could invent by
randomly combining properties together disjunctively. Moreover, in
order for us to say that we know something that all examples of hate
speech have in common even without having to look at all examples
of hate speech, we would have to be able to set out the complete
formulation of the disjunction in advance of looking at all examples
of hate speech. But that seems like a tall order. It scarcely seems
probable that we have at our finger tips a definitive list of all the
forms of speech, all the kinds of symbols, all the types of speech act,
and all the kinds of targeted characteristics that are associated with
the concept hate speech. No doubt we could provide a set of ex-
tremely long lists, but for all we know there could be many things
that are not included in the lists but which competent users of the
term ‘hate speech’ would nevertheless treat as hate speech. Over
time people apply the term ‘hate speech’ in unanticipated ways and
the rate of new applications does not show signs of reaching zero
any time soon. If competent users of the term ‘hate speech’ do not
possess a priori knowledge of the complete disjunction, then this is
devastating to the claim that they possess a priori knowledge of a set
97 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 37 [67].
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of necessary and sufficient conditions for appropriately applying the
term.
But do we really need an analytic definition of the term ‘hate
speech’? Does the concept hate speech become irredeemably artificial
and incoherent without it? I would suggest not. One distinctive
feature of family resemblances concepts is the fact that everything
that falls under the concept shares at least one similar quality, fea-
ture, or descriptive property with at least one other thing that falls
under the concept, even if there is no single quality, feature, or
descriptive property that is common to all things that fall under the
concept. This means that if we as competent users pause to look at
examples that fall under a family resemblances concept, then, as
Wittgenstein puts it, ‘we see a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the
small’.98 Thus, a competent user may know of many examples of
hate speech and know of many similarities, but not know of one
similarity shared by all the examples. This knowledge comes by
learning how to be a participant in the complex activity of using the
term ‘hate speech’. It is a matter of acquiring what Oswald Hanfling
has called ‘participatory knowledge’, which has to do with learning
what to say and what not to say, and with participating alongside
other speakers not only in using the term but also in giving and
receiving sanctions for not using the term correctly.99 This partici-
patory knowledge prevents usage of the term from lapsing into
incoherence.
But why, then, is it not the case that every form of speech can be
subsumed under the concept hate speech given that every form of
speech has at least one similarity with forms of hate speech, not least
the similarity of speech? Wittgenstein approaches this problem by
pointing to the way we explain things like games, or the family
resemblances concept game, to other people. He writes:
98 Ibid., p. 36 [66]. The precise meaning of distinction that Wittgenstein is getting when he mentions
‘similarities in the large and in the small’ (‘Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen’) is not clear-cut. ‘Sim-
ilarities in the large’, for example, could be taken to mean: (1) qualities or features or descriptive
properties that are common to a large number of things that fall under the concept; (2) that two or
more things that fall under the concept share in common a large number of their qualities or features or
descriptive properties; or (3) that two or more things that fall under the concept share in common a
quality or feature or descriptive property that is important or encompassing or immediately noticeable
when looked at.
99 Oswald Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 54.
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How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should
describe games to him, and we might add: ‘‘This and similar things are called
‘games’’.100
In other words, ‘One gives examples and intends them to be taken in
a particular way’.101 But Wittgenstein also makes it clear that he does
not mean that someone ‘is supposed to see in those examples that
common feature which [the explainer] was unable to formulate’,102
as though the examples are intended to be the vital clue to, or
somehow stand-in as a shorthand for, the feature or features that are
common to all games, or as though there is an essence to games
after all. Instead, we are teaching the other person how to be a
participant in the activity of using the term ‘games’; which is to say,
directing him or her to use it as we have done, namely, by using it
with reference to the paradigmatic examples or exemplars we have
highlighted and by making rational judgement calls as to what other
things are similar and so can also be called ‘games’.
This, I think, provides one plausible story about what it was that
the original users of the term ‘hate speech’ were doing when they
provided examples. Think about the sequence of events in which a
language user or community of users focuses its attention on certain
speech episodes and decides to dub them ‘hate speech’ (the moment
at which the term is coined). In fact, it is likely that the term ‘hate
speech’ first came into usage in April 1988 during an ADL-sponsored
conference at Hofstra University organised by Monroe H. Freed-
man, then Dean of Hofstra Law School. At the conference numer-
ous descriptions of speech events were put forward for discussion
and some of the speakers called them ‘hate messages’,103 ‘the lan-
guage of hatred’, or simply ‘hate speech’104 (others used the older
100 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 37 [69].
101 Ibid., p. 38 [71].
102 Ibid.
103 Mari Matsuda, ‘Outsider Jurisprudence: Toward a Victim’s Analysis of Racial Hate Messages’, in
M. Freedman and E. Freedman (eds.) Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The Relationship Between
Language and Violence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 87, 96.
104 Kenneth Lasson, ‘To Stimulate, Provoke, or Incite: Hate Speech and the First Amendment’, in
M. Freedman and E. Freedman (eds.) Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The Relationship Between
Language and Violence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 268.
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term ‘group defamation’105). Interestingly, it was an interview with
Freedman that provided the basis for Tamar Jacoby’s 1988 article in
Newsweek106 which the Oxford English Dictionary cites as one of the
first sources of the term ‘hate speech’.107 For her part, Matsuda also
used the terms ‘racist hate speech’ and ‘hate speech’ in her com-
mentary at a roundtable discussion held in November 1988 at the
State University of New York at Buffalo.108 And in 1989 Matsuda
published a revised version of her Hofstra conference paper in which
she uses the term ‘hate speech’ repeatedly and systematically.109
Matsuda’s article begins with a brief account of some examples of
hate speech, including one event she experienced directly.110 And so
what she goes on to explain about hate speech in the article might
be paraphrased, in Wittgensteinean terms, as follows: ‘These and
similar things are called ‘hate speech’ and I intend them to be part of
the rules governing the social practice of using this term.’ Indeed,
although all of Matsuda’s initial examples involve racist hate speech,
she goes on to make it clear that in her judgement racist hate speech
is not the only form of hate speech and that anti-gay and anti-lesbian
speech are similar things.111 Putting this another way, it might be
possible to describe what Matsuda and others were doing as
pioneering a complex norm-governed social practice of using the
term ‘hate speech’ in some ways and for some examples but not for
others.112 Over time the repertoire of this practice has grown sig-
nificantly, extending to types of examples not initially flagged up by
Matsuda.
This raises a question as to whether users of the term ‘hate
speech’ treat some elements of the repertoire, some members of the
family resemblances concept hate speech, as more significant than
others. Interestingly, in her work on the way human beings know or
105 See Monroe H. Freedman and Eric M. Freedman (eds.) Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech:
The Relationship Between Language and Violence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995).
106 Tamar Jacoby, ‘Time to Outlaw Racial Slurs? New Questions About Protecting Hateful Speech’,
Newsweek, June 6 (1988): 48.
107 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Hate Speech’, July 2002. Available at www.oed.com.
108 Mari Matsuda, ‘Commentary – Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and
American Perspectives on Group Defamation’, Buffalo Law Review 37 (1988–1989): 359–364.
109 Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, pp. 2322–2323, 2326–2327, 2331–2334, 2347, 2363–
2364, 2370–2378, 2380.
110 Ibid., pp. 2320–2321.
111 Ibid., pp. 2331–2332.
112 Cf. Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
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become aware of concepts at the level of mental cognition, Eleanor
Rosch has sought to experimentally support the hypothesis that
some members of family resemblances concepts, prototypes, are more
central than others.113 This, put simply, means that people who
understand the concept will tend to rank prototypes higher as good
examples of the category and will recognise them as members of the
concept more quickly, and will name them more frequently when
asked to name a few exemplars. For example, when asked to give an
example of the concept furniture, chair is more frequently cited than
lamp. Even more interestingly, Beverley Fehr and James A. Russell
have sought to demonstrate experimentally the idea that love is a
concept that denotes a very large number of forms of love but that
some forms of love, such as maternal love, friendship love, and
romantic love, tend to be mentioned more often as forms of love,
tend to be ranked higher as good examples of love, tend to be ranked
more quickly as examples of love, and tend to be less frequently
denied as being examples of love.114 Perhaps similar experiments
could be conducted for the concept hate speech to see which, if any,
forms of hate speech are prototypes, and whether these prototypes
are or are not the very forms of hate speech that were first associated
with the term ‘hate speech’ by Matsuda and others in the late 1980s.
It would also be interesting to know whether any examples of the
legal concept hate speech crop up as prototype or core examples of
the ordinary concept hate speech.115 For example, it would be inter-
esting to know whether ordinary language users would treat incite-
ment to hatred as a prototype or core example of the ordinary concept
hate speech, analogous to the way lawmakers and international
organisations often seem to focus on this form of hate speech above
other forms.
113 Eleanor Rosch, ‘Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories’, Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology 104 (1975): 192–233; Eleanor Rosch, Wittgenstein and categorization research in cognitive psychology,
in M. Chapman and R. Dixon (eds.) Meaning and the growth of understanding: Wittgenstein’s significance for
developmental Psychology (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1987).
114 Beverley Fehr and James A. Russell, ‘The Concept of Love Viewed From a Prototype Per-
spective’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60 (1991): 425–438.
115 In my book I identified ten clusters of laws that have been used to restrict, directly or indirectly,
uses of hate speech. Brown, Hate Speech Law, Chap. 2. These furnish a legal concept hate speech which
includes various more specific legal subconcepts hate speech, including group defamation, negative
stereotyping or stigmatisation, the use of insults or words expressing ideas of moral inferiority, incitement to
hatred, speech that poses a threat to public order, denial or glorification of genocide, affront to dignity, and
discriminatory harassment or intimidation. Would ordinary language users recognise similar examples of
hate speech, and would they recognise any of them as prototype or core examples of the ordinary
concept hate speech?
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But putting to one side this potentially interesting research agenda in
the field of prototype theory and psycholinguistics, it is worth empha-
sising that a complicated patchwork of overlapping and criss-crossing
similarities is likely to produce tremendous internal diversity. I have
already touched upon some of the diversity of hate speech in this article
aswell as in ‘TheMyth ofHate’.Wehave seen that the ordinary concept
hate speech encompasses: a family of different purposes including but not
limited to highlighting forms of harmful speech, flagging up socially
divisive forms of speech, identifying forms of speech that can undermine
people’s sense of equality, articulating civility norms, and labelling forms
of speech that undermine democracy; a family of types of speech in-
cluding but not limited to insults, slurs, and epithets, words that express
or articulate ideas relating to the moral inferiority, group defamation,
and negative stereotypes or generics; a family of types of speech act
including but not limited to insulting, disparaging, degrading, humili-
ating, misrecognising, disheartening, harassing, persecuting, threaten-
ing, provoking, inciting hatred, discriminationor violence, and justifying
or glorifying discrimination or violence; and a family of characteristics
including but not limited to race, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship sta-
tus, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability.
But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Other writers have observed
that hate speech can take permanent or semi-permanent forms as
well as transient or fleeting forms.116 It can exist in written words,
but it can also exist in spoken words. And it can take the form of
signs, symbols, gestures, images, pictures, plays, music, and video
games.117 Hate speech can be comprised of well thought-out state-
ments of fact or exaggerated hyperbole. It can be longwinded and
convoluted tirades or short sharp monosyllabic insults or slurs. It can
be formal lectures or off the cuff remarks. It can be sober or
humorous, poetry or prose. In fact, it can take all manner of literary
forms, anything from rhetorical questions to jokes, metaphors,
116 See, e.g., Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, pp. 1609–1610.
117 See, e.g., Delgado and Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound, p. 11. Waldron has tentatively
suggested that hate speech could be most problematic when it takes permanent or semi-permanent
forms – published words, graffiti, posters, leaflets, badges on clothing, burning symbols and effigies. See
Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, pp. 1603–1604, 1618. But then he immediately concedes that when
hate speech in its transient forms – the spoken word, broadcast music – is repeated by enough people it
can become a permanent or semi-permanent fixture of the sound environment. Ibid., pp. 1623–1624.
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myths, and proverbs.118 The style can be temperate or intemperate,
emotive or calm, aggressive or passive, sincere or sarcastic.119 Hate
speech is sometimes overt and unconcealed, but sometimes veiled
and coded.120 It can be done by an identified speaker or by an
anonymous speaker.121 Hate speech can be used in private settings
or public settings or in places that are both public and private. Hate
speech can be performed by people in authority or by ordinary
citizens, by professionals as much as by blue collar workers.122 Hate
speech can be directed at or targeted toward, in the sense of being
directly addressed to, an individual or individuals identified by pro-
tected characteristics, but it can also be about, and in a sense gen-
erally addressed to, an entire group or class of persons identified by
such characteristics.123 Hate speech is very often addressed to people
who are members of the very groups that the relevant words are
about or to which the words refer, but hate speech can also be
addressed to people who are not members of the very groups in
question such as in the case of incitement to hatred.124 The targets of
118 See Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2368; Laraine R. Fergensen, ‘Group
Defamation: From Language to Thought to Action’, in M. Freedman and E. Freedman (eds.) Group
Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The Relationship Between Language and Violence (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 75–80; Asante, ‘Identifying Racist Language: Linguistic Acts and Signs’, pp.
92–93; Musolff, ‘Dehumanizing Metaphors in UK Immigrant Debates in Press and Online Media’, p. 49.
119 Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, pp. 214–215.
120 Delgado and Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound, p. 11.
121 Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech, p. 1.
122 Delgado and Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound, pp. 11–12.
123 Ibid., p. 11. Interestingly, several authors believe that hate speech is most regulatable when it is
directly targeted at or addressed to a particular individual or individuals identified by protected char-
acteristics as opposed to when it is about, and only indirectly or generally addressed to, an entire group
or class of persons identified by such characteristics. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, ‘Hate Speech and
Harassment: The Constitutionality of Campus Codes that Prohibit Racial Insults’, William and Mary Bill
of Rights Journal 3 (1994): 179–217, p. 179; Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words, p. 63; Nicholas Wolfson,
Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 60; Steven H. Shiffrin,
Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 76–
77; Thomas W. Peard, ‘Regulating Racist Speech on Campus’, in C. Sistare (ed.) Civility and Its
Discontents: Civic Virtue, Toleration, and Cultural Fragmentation (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press,
2004), p. 142; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, ‘Four Observations About Hate Speech’, Wake Forest
Law Review 44 (2009): 353–370, pp. 362–263; Caleb Yong, ‘Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate
Speech?’, Res Publica 17 (2011): 385–403, pp. 394–396.
124 In the case of a racist or ethnic epithet like ‘chink’, the word refers to Chinese people and when
someone calls a Chinese person a chink to his or her face or in an online message, say, the hate speech is
addressed to a person who is a member of the very group to which the word refers. The person is both
the subject of hate speech and subjected to hate speech. By contrast, consider speech which is intended
to stir up racial or ethnic hatred but which is actually addressed to an audience who do not belong to
the racial or ethnic group against whom hatred is being stirred up. A union boss gives a speech to a
group of white labourers in which he says, ‘It is the duty of all good white citizens to unite against these
Chinese coolies, who deserve only our hatred and contempt for working cheaper than we can suffer to
work, cheaper than even a dog could work.’
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hate speech either can be free to avoid it or they can be a captive
audience.125
Bearing this diversity in mind, it seems to me that when writers
are criticised on the grounds that ‘their examples of hate speech do
not self-evidently make up a ‘unitary’ phenomenon’,126 we might
respond on their behalf by asking, ‘Why must we assume that hate
speech is a unitary phenomenon?’ Or, ‘Why must we suppose that
the ordinary concept hate speech must be subject to the sort of precise
and agreed definition as we might expect of the legal concept hate
speech?’ No doubt similar amounts of internal variety are exemplified
across the family of practices that ordinary language users are apt to
call ‘games’.127 But here we do not attack people for using the term
‘game’ for their inability to provide a precise definition.
I wish to make it clear at this point that the above family
resemblances analysis is intended to apply first and foremost to the
ordinary concept hate speech. The legal concept (or class of legal
concepts) hate speech has itself inspired ordinary users to take up the
term ‘hate speech’. But now that the genie is out of the bottle it has
taken on a life of its own, and the ordinary concept hate speech may
have outgrown the narrow, technical legal definition of ‘hate speech’
as incitement to hatred that is used in many legal jurisdictions.
Therefore, I concur with Donna L. Lillian when she writes that the
‘critique’ that writers have failed to provide a ‘narrow definition of
hate speech’ ‘is well taken if one’s primary concern is in dealing with
legal and constitutional aspects of hate speech, but not necessarily if
one’s primary concern is with linguistic, communicative, social, or
cultural aspects of hate speech.’128 The main purpose of the idea of
family resemblances is to point out that in these other domains we
do not need narrow definitions to know what we are talking about.
It is an open question whether the legal concept (or class of
concepts) hate speech is also a family resemblances concept. Now it is
certainly true that if we are talking about more specific, less general
legal concepts that are to be used by courts, then we need to aspire
towards having clear boundaries and a single unambiguous meaning.
125 Delgado and Stefancic, ‘Four Observations About Hate Speech’, p. 362.
126 John D. H. Downing, ‘‘‘Hate Speech’’ and ‘‘First Amendment Absolutism’’ Discourses in the
United States’, Discourse and Society 10 (1999): 175–189, p. 180.
127 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 36 [66].
128 Donna L. Lillian, ‘A Thorn By Any Other Name: Sexist Discourse as Hate Speech’, Discourse
Society 18 (2007): 719–740, p. 733.
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The elements of specific civil or criminal offences must be couched
in language that enables prosecutors, judges and juries to check off
the elements of the offence against the circumstances of given legal
cases. It is especially important for new and relatively artificial legal
concepts that they can be given sufficient specificity to enable not
only legal professionals but also the public at large to have a rea-
sonable grasp of what they mean so that they can predict potential
liability. For example, the legal concept group libel has a long history
dating back at least as far as Roman defamation law which protected
ruling groups,129 and to the common law concept seditious libel.130
But it has also evolved over time into various more specific, less
general legal concepts such as group libel (sensu stricto), incitement to
hatred, speech against protected groups or classes of persons that causes or
is likely to cause a breach of the peace.131 Our understanding of these
concepts still reflects to some extent the older concept, but these are
still relatively new pieces of legal conceptual equipment. The same
goes for the legal concept discriminatory harassment. For relatively
new pieces of legal conceptual equipment the challenge is to provide
a definition that can be justiciable, that is, the subject of legal or
quasi-legal proceedings in a court of law, tribunal, or hearing. So, if
the main purpose of the idea of family resemblances is to point out
that we do not need definitions to know what we are talking about,
then arguably this purpose is out of place in the case of more specific,
less general legal concepts like incitement to hatred. However, the
same does not necessarily follow for the most inclusive or abstract
legal concepts. These concepts enable us to talk about a broad range
of more specific, less general concepts. And so we might think that it
is appropriate for the general legal concept hate speech to operate as
an umbrella or family resemblances concept, especially in instru-
ments of intentional law which must somehow speak to a wide
variety of domestic laws. To say that we do not need a narrow
definition of the umbrella legal concept hate speech, however, is
perfectly consistent with also saying that we do need narrow defi-
nitions of more specific, less general legal concepts such as group
129 David Riesman, ‘Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel’, Columbia Law Review 42
(1942): 727–780, p. 728.
130 Ibid., pp. 734–756.
131 See, e.g., Brown, Hate Speech Law, Chap. 2.
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defamation, incitement to hatred, discriminatory harassment, and so
forth.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS
In this two-part article I have argued that the concept hate speech is
best conceived not as a compositional concept but as an equivocal
idiom. I have also tried to excavate some of the multiple meanings of
this concept by highlighting some of the jobs we expect it to per-
form, some of the folk platitudes that surround it, and some of the
types of speech and speech act that exemplify it. Along the way I
have also sought to explode the myth of hate. Finally, I have argued
that the ordinary concept hate speech, and perhaps also the legal
concept hate speech, is a family resemblances concept.
Why do these arguments matter? Taking them in reverse order, I
believe that getting clearer about the nature of hate speech as a family
resemblances concept may make us more alive to recognising as hate
speech forms of speech that we might not have recognised as such
had we been expecting a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
For example, if we had tried to build a narrow definition of hate
speech based on the work of critical race theorists we may have
ended up thinking that something is hate speech if and only it is a
racist insult. But the concept hate speech is useful precisely because it
can be diversified to encompass an array of things that are both like
and unlike racist insults, and which are like and unlike each other.
The very fact that the concept hate speech denotes a complicated
patchwork of overlapping and criss-crossing similarities renders it a
far more flexible concept.
Indeed, it is worth remembering that a failure to recognise things
as hate speech can have negative practical consequences. One is that
when authorities or society as a whole do not even recognise certain
forms of speech as hate speech it might serve to normalise, sanction,
or authorise the relevant hate speakers to carry on doing what they
are doing. Another is that it might lead authorities or society as a
whole to neglect to take the necessary active steps to tackle hate
speech, and this could mean that victims of unrecognised hate
speech end of up lacking parity of protection as compared to victims
of recognised hate speech.
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Of course, some people might be inclined to reject out of hand all
hate speech regulations on the basis that there is no agreement about
the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’. How can we ban it if nobody
is agreed about what it is? What I have tried to show, however, is
that the term ‘hate speech’ has a family of meanings, and so any
questions about whether or not and why we should ban hate speech
must be addressed in the final analysis to particular members of the
family. Indeed, we stand a much better chance of arriving at narrow
definitions we can all share when we focus on particular members of
the family. Once we understand this, then the disagreement cliché
loses its power as a weapon against particular hate speech regula-
tions.
In addition, I believe that if my arguments about the myth of hate
are correct, then this has some important implications not merely for
the way we think about the nature of hate speech, but also for what
we say about how authorities should deal with hate speech, whether
by instituting hate speech regulations and/or employing extralegal
measures like education and counter-speech, or simply doing noth-
ing at all. In the first instance, I suspect that exploding the myth of
hate might under certain circumstances help to neuter at least two
objections that have been levelled against hate speech regulations.
First, some people are hostile to hate speech regulations because
they think that it is not the business of the state to regulate people’s
emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred, which are part of
people’s inner or private world. But if we dispel the misnomer that
hate speech is essentially or necessarily connected with hate or
hatred, then it may be easier to persuade such people that in fact
regulating hate speech is not in the business of telling people what to
feel or think. Second, some people are deeply ambivalent towards
hate speech bans because they quite justifiably believe that the mere
fact that an audience hates a form of speech is not in itself a legiti-
mate reason to ban it. But once the myth of hate is exploded it
becomes much harder to sustain the misleading idea that something
qualifies as hate speech only if it is the sort of speech that we hate.
And so hate speech laws do not seek to ban speech simply in virtue
of the fact an audience hates it.
That being said, it could be pointed out that if what counts as hate
speech is simply a matter of extension, that is, based on similarities
WHAT IS HATE SPEECH?
with exemplar cases, people will not be inclined to accept the reg-
ulation of hate speech unless they accept that the exemplar cases
should be regulated. This seems fair. But here once again I think that
exploding the myth of hate might be useful. I believe that even when
Matsuda and other critical race theorists used the term ‘hate speech’
in reference to exemplar cases, they were not assuming or presup-
posing that all such speech is motivated by emotions, feelings, or
attitudes of hate or hatred. For example, many of Matsuda’s exem-
plar cases involve the use of racist slurs and insults against members
of racial minorities, but Matsuda does not incorporate into her
descriptions of these cases the crude assumption that the perpetra-
tors were necessarily expressing or motivated by hate or hatred.
What is more, both Matsuda and Delgado support the use of various
kinds of hate speech laws in tackling the problem of hate speech – for
example, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil
rights laws forbidding discriminatory harassment in the workplace,
campus codes banning discriminatory harassment in universities132 –
and, what is more, actively propose the ‘creation of a new crime of
racist speech’133 or a new ‘tort for racial insult’.134 Yet at the same
time none of these laws specify being motivated by hate or hatred
among the basic elements of the relevant offences. Once critics of
hate speech laws reflect on these facts surely it becomes much harder
to object to hate speech laws on the grounds that they are about
regulating people’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred.
Nonetheless, what about incitement to hatred laws? Are not such
laws explicitly about controlling people’s innermost emotions, feel-
ings, or attitudes by force of law? Indeed, even Matsuda suggests that
the main point and purpose of incitement to hatred law is ‘avoiding
the spread of hatred’.135 This is certainly one way to look at these
laws, but it is by no means the only way. Another way starts from
the basic fact that these laws do not ban hate or hatred as such; what
they ban is the act of stirring up these potentially pernicious states of
mind. (Interestingly, some people object to incitement to hatred laws
precisely because these laws ban the stirring up of hatred against
132 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2336, n. 83; Richard Delgado, ‘Words
That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 17 (1982): 133 –181, p. 133.
133 Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2360, n. 207.
134 Delgado, ‘Words That Wound’, pp. 179–180.
135 Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2347.
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groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics
when there are no parallel laws banning merely hating people be-
cause of their possession or perceived possession of protected char-
acteristics.136) Thus, it might be argued that the real function of
incitement to hatred laws is to protect people’s autonomy. In
short, the aim is not for the state to control people’s emotions,
feelings, or sentiments but instead for the state to intervene to
prevent some citizens from illegitimately seizing control of other
citizens’ emotions, feelings, or sentiments.137 This comes out in
the English case R. v. el-Faisal138 involving the prosecution of a
Muslim cleric for inter alia using threatening, abusive or insulting
words or behaviour with the intention of stirring up racial hatred
against Jews. In his sentencing remarks Judge Beaumont touched
upon el-Faisal’s position as a cleric, with the power to shape the
minds of ‘young and impressionable’ people within the local
Muslim community.139 To clarify, my main point here is not that
incitement to hatred has nothing to do with hatred. Nor that hate
speech properly called is never connected to hatred. Both of these
claims are plainly false. Instead, my point is that getting clearer
about the precise nature of the contingent connection between
the concept hate speech and the concept emotions, feelings, or atti-
tudes of hate or hatred can shed new light even on forms of hate
speech, such as incitement to hatred, which are closely connected
with hatred, and in ways that might undercut certain objections
to laws banning hate speech.
Another of my main aims has been to question the assumption
that the best way to explain the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ is
compositionally, drawing on a combination of literal and non-literal
meanings of the term ‘hate’. But even though I think the best way to
understand the concept hate speech is non-compositionally, I do not
think that we should abandon the term ‘hate speech’ simply because
the word ‘hate’ is misleading. For one thing, it would be wrong, I
think, to say that the word ‘hate’ is grossly misleading. The term
‘hate speech’ is used to refer to a wide variety of speech, and
136 See, e.g., David Nash and Chara Bakalis, ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred and the ‘Symbolic’:
How will the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 work?’, Liverpool Law Review 28 (2007): 349–375, p.
367.
137 See, e.g., Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 58–66.
138 No. T20027343 (Central Criminal Court, March 7, 2003).
139 Transcript obtained from Smith Bernal Reporting Ltd.
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sometimes, as I have said, this speech is closely connected with
emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. So the word ‘hate’
gets us thinking in not wholly inappropriate ways about hate speech
in numerous instances. If hate speech never involved hate or hatred,
then the case for abandoning the term would be undeniable. So the
word ‘hate’ is not grossly misleading. But it is still misleading. And it
is misleading because other instances of hate speech do not involve
and have no connection with hate or hatred. Many instances have
instead a close connection with contempt, disdain, scorn, or con-
descension. Some instances are related to feelings or sensations of
disgust or revulsion. And yet more instances are bound up with a
desire or emotional need on the part of the speaker to be accepted as
part of an in-group or even a basic wish to be noticed or the subject
of public attention. Then again, some instances might have nothing
to do with any of these things.
Now it might be further objected at this stage that my own
arguments support a different conclusion to the one I have pre-
sented. Rather than try to rehabilitate our understanding of the
semantics of the term ‘hate speech’, surely I should be agitating for
societies to abandon this term entirely. Would not it be simpler and
more responsible to tell people to stop using the term ‘hate speech’
rather than seeking to educate them about the ways in which the
word ‘hate’ can be misleading?
I think not, and for three main reasons. First, even though the
term ‘hate speech’ invites the myth of hate it is not as though we
have plenty of other words to choose from which are not misleading
in one way or another. If we used a word such as ‘contempt’ to
create ‘contempt speech’, it might give the misleading impression
that hate speech is essentially and necessarily connected with the
emotion, sentiment, or attitude of looking down on something,
regarding something as unworthy of one’s consideration or respect.
This might well be involved in many instances of hate speech, but it
will not be involved in all instances. Similarly, if we use the word
‘prejudiced’ to create ‘prejudiced speech’, it might give other mis-
leading impressions. And so the term ‘hate speech’ can be a ser-
viceable substitute for a less misleading but equally elegant
descriptor for the relevant family resemblances concept that we have
yet to think of. Of course, in the case of the legal concept hate speech
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the term ‘hate speech’ replaced the term ‘group libel’. So maybe
some other, better term will come along and displace ‘hate speech’.
In that sense debunking the term ‘hate speech’ might turn out to be
a transitional strategy.
Second, if people (like me) who acknowledge the problem of hate
speech and believe that at least some hate speech laws can be
warranted all things considered (even if this means some compro-
mise of principles) begin to argue for societies to drop all usage of
the term ‘hate speech’ just at the moment the concept is gaining
popular understanding, then it could be a case of ‘be careful of what
you wish for’. If hate speech is a problem that we have an obligation
to do something about, then we need some term or other to refer to
it, to provide a focal point for campaigners and pressure groups, and
to give legislators something to wrap their heads around. If we lose
the term ‘hate speech’, it might give the false impression that there is
no problem, and the impetus to do something about it could be lost.
So we carry on with the term ‘hate speech’ whilst at the same time
being mindful of its limitations.
Third, I would point out that the term ‘hate speech’ can continue
to play various important roles even once the myth of hate has been
exploded. Even if we come to realise that hate speech does not
necessarily have to do with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or
hatred, surely we can still use the term ‘hate speech’ to identify
forms of speech that disproportionately harm already disadvantaged
or victimised members of society, or that are destructive of social
cohesion, or that run contrary to fundamental democratic values.
Likewise, even if we have rejected the myth of hate we can never-
theless use the term ‘hate speech’ to express disapproval of certain
forms of speech and to flag them up as regulatable.
Finally, I want to draw out some implications of my claim that
the legal concept hate speech and the ordinary concept hate speech
have come to something of a parting of the ways. It seems to me
that if a society thinks that the legal concept hate speech is the only
concept of hate speech, then it may also be inclined to stick with a
narrowly restricted definition of hate speech as incitement to hatred,
and may even fall into thinking that the only choice for authorities in
responding to hate speech is either the criminal law or doing
nothing. However, if, as I believe it should, a society comes to realise
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that the ordinary concept hate speech denotes a heterogeneous col-
lection of phenomena held together by family resemblances rather
than a single essential feature, then there is no earthly reason for that
society not to start to look for a plurality of ways of responding to
hate speech, and to embrace the idea that the criminal law is not the
only way of combating hate speech.
I offer two illustrations of this implication. First, the European
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has recently
issued its General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating
Hate Speech.140 Part of the purpose of this recommendation is to
qualify and supplement recommendations set out in General Policy
Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism
and Racial Discrimination from 2002.141 The latter recommends to
the governments of the 47 member States of the Council of Europe
that they should enact, implement, and enforce criminal laws that
penalise various types of hate speech.142 For its part, General Policy
Recommendation No. 15 highlights some of the limitations of using
the criminal law in combating hate speech – such as the danger that
criminal laws can be used against the very minorities they are de-
signed protect – and recommends some additional steps that gov-
ernments should take to combat hate speech besides criminal law.
These steps include: develop educational programmes for children,
young persons, public officials and the general public that discourage
the use of hate speech; engage in governmental counter-speech
against hate speech; promote and encourage civil society and victims
to engage in counter-speech against hate speech; provide assistance
to victims on how to cope with the psychological effects of hate
speech and give information to victims about their legal rights;
encourage and promote forms of self-regulation of hate speech by
public and private institutions; ensure effective use is made of the
powers to combat hate speech by media and Internet regulators;
withdraw material support by public bodies for political parties and
other organisations that use hate speech. Given this, it is logical that
140 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No. 15 On Combating Hate Speech, December 8, 2015,
Strasbourg. Available at www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GPR/EN/Recommendation_
N15/REC-15-2016-015-ENG.pdf.
141 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination, December 13, 2002, Strasbourg. Available at www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
ecri/activities/GPR/EN/Recommendation_N7/ecri03-8%20recommendation%20nr%207.pdf.
142 Ibid., s. 18.
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GPR No. 15 adopts a relatively broad definition of hate speech, one
that encompasses much more than the common legal definition of
hate speech as incitement to hatred.
[H]ate speech is to be understood for the purpose of the present General Policy
Recommendation as the advocacy, promotion or incitement, in any form, of the
denigration, hatred or vilification of a person or group of persons, as well as any
harassment, insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatization or threat in respect of
such a person or group of persons and the justification of all the preceding types of
expression, on the ground of ‘race’, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, age,
disability, language, religion or belief, sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orien-
tation and other personal characteristics or status; Recognising that hate speech
may take the form of the public denial, trivialisation, justification or condonation
of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes which have been
found by courts to have occurred, and of the glorification of persons convicted for
having committed such crimes […]143
This definition not merely reflects the plural nature of hate speech as a
family resemblances concept but also renders more coherent ECRI’s
own recommendation for amultidimensional approach to tackling the
problem of hate speech. (It also enables ECRI to speak to a variety of
member states with diverse experiences of, and diverse legal and extra-
legal approaches to tackling, the problem of hate speech.)
Second, Internet companies are increasingly taking interest in the
need to limit the use of hate speech on their platforms and websites. It
is a matter of debate whether this is ultimately motivated by com-
mercial interest as opposed to loftier concerns to protect people from
harm. But either way, what is clear is that when it comes to the
definition of the term ‘hate speech’ some Internet companies are
adopting definitions that go beyond narrow legalistic definitions.
Compare YouTube and Facebook. YouTube is a video sharing Internet
platform that enables users to post videos to be viewed and com-
mented on by other users. It is not primarily used as a social net-
workingwebsite ormessaging service. It ismore akin to a public square
for showing videos to anyone and everyone. It is because of this, I
think, that YouTube’s ‘community guidelines’ characterise hate
speech in relatively narrow terms, akin to legal definitions of hate
speech. ‘Hate speech refers to content that promotes violence or
hatred against individuals or groups based on certain attributes’.144 By
143 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No. 15 On Combating Hate Speech, at p. 3.
144 Available at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939.
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contrast, Facebook is a social networking website that permits users to
post content on personal and group profile pages and to sendmessages
to other users in reasonably targeted ways. As such, Facebook’s
‘community standards’ recognise and disallow twomain forms of hate
speech. On the one hand, the standards address forms of hate abuse
that are often directed at particular users. ‘Facebook removes hate
speech, which includes content that directly attacks people based on
their: race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual ori-
entation, sex, gender or gender identity, or serious disabilities or dis-
eases.’145 On the other hand, there are forms of more generalised
incitement to hatred that are addressed to a wider audience, whether
an audience of like-minded people or would-be followers. ‘Organisa-
tions and people dedicated to promoting hatred against these protected
groups are not allowed a presence on Facebook’.146 Indeed, as a direct
response to high-profile complaints made by pressure groups about its
failure to enforce its rules against hate speech, particularly hate speech
of a personalised nature directly targeted at female users, in May 2013
Facebook posted a statement that acknowledged these complaints, set
out a series of new steps for tackling the problem, and clarified its
position on the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’.
While there is no universally accepted definition of hate speech, as a platform we
define the term to mean direct and serious attacks on any protected category of
people based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual
orientation, disability or disease. We work hard to remove hate speech quickly,
however there are instances of offensive content, including distasteful humor, that
are not hate speech according to our definition. In these cases, we work to apply
fair, thoughtful, and scalable policies. This approach allows us to continue
defending the principles of freedom of self-expression on which Facebook is
founded. We’ve also found that posting insensitive or cruel content often results in
many more people denouncing it than supporting it on Facebook. That being said,
we realize that our defense of freedom of expression should never be interpreted
as license to bully, harass, abuse or threaten violence. We are committed to
working to ensure that this does not happen within the Facebook community. We
believe that the steps outlined below will help us achieve this goal.147
What this shows, I think, is that Internet companies are adopting
definitions of the term ‘hate speech’ which are, within the broad
145 Available at www.facebook.com/communitystandards#.
146 Ibid.
147 Available at www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and-hateful-spee
ch-on-facebook/574430655911054.
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family of meanings associated with the concept, tailored to fit the
particular forms of speech and communication that occur on given
websites and platforms and that are generally recognised as hate
speech by the relevant users and by high-profile campaigners and
pressure groups. In the case of Facebook’s clarification of policy in
May 2013, for example, the company was responding to users and
campaigners who were essentially saying, ‘Misogynist abuse is
sufficiently similar to other things you call ‘hate speech’ that you
really must take it more seriously and work harder to remove it as
you do other hate speech.’
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